HTCONDOR-2021-0003
| Summary: | 
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| Using standard command-line tools, a user with only READ access to a SchedD or Collector can discover secrets that could allow them to control other users jobs and/or read their data. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Access Required: | READ access to HTCondor daemons | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| An attacker need only have READ-level authorization to a vulnerable daemon. This means they are able to run tools like condor_q or condor_status. Many pools do not require authentication for READ-level commands so it is likely that an attacker could execute this command remotely from an untrusted network, unless otherwise prevented by a firewall or other network-level access controls. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Effort Required: | Medium | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| An attacker would need to write custom tools and be very familiar with the HTCondor wire protocols to carry out a succesful attack. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Impact/Consequences: | High | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| This attack allows a user to control a running job submitted by another user. This could let them read that job's data and/or inject their own executables into that job that would then run as that user. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Workaround: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| There is no workaround for this issue. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Full Details: | Embargoed until future notice. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||