

# Overview of the WiSA Infrastructure and Applications

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
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
Madison, WI 53706-1685



# Architecture




# Code Generation



# Dynamic Buffer Overflow Detection

- Detect buffer overflows that alter return addresses
- Rewrite binary programs to detect and correct programming flaws
  - Return address verification
  - Safe string operations
- Jonathon Giffin, Hao Wang


# Dynamic Buffer Overflow Detection



# Malicious Code Detection

- Detect viruses and other malware mutated using obfuscation transformations
- Use static analysis to locate malicious code fragments embedded in a program
  - Deobfuscate program code
  - Identify malicious code sequences split across procedure calls
- Mihai Christodorescu, Somesh Jha

# Malicious Code Detection




# Static Buffer Overflow Detection

- Incorporate buffer overrun detection for C source code in a program understanding framework
- Flow-insensitive, partly context-sensitive
- Formulate and solve problem as linear program
- Two solvers developed
  - Fast and approximate
  - Mathematically precise
- Vinod Ganapathy, Somesh Jha




# Static Buffer Overflow Detection



# Value-Set Analysis

- Create an Intermediate-Representation (IR) for an x86 binary (for further analysis)
- IR - similar to that of a C compiler
  - CFG, used, killed, may-killed variables, points-to sets, etc.
  - Key challenge - understanding memory operations
    - No symbol-table/debug information
    - Explicit memory addresses
    - Indirect addressing
    - Pointer arithmetic
- Gogul Balakrishnan, Tom Reps


# Value-Set Analysis



# Model-Based Intrusion Detection

- Detect attempts to subvert processes
- Specify constraints upon program behavior
  - Statically constructed execution model
  - **Dyck model**: efficient & context-sensitive
- At run-time, ensure execution obeys model
- Jonathon Giffin, Somesh Jha, Barton Miller


# Model-Based Intrusion Detection




# Future Directions

- Support multiple architectures
- Include new static analyses
- Expand rewriting API
- Develop architecture-independent rewriter interface for code creation & insertion

# SandboX86



# SandboX86





# ESL for Kazaa

## ESL (segment)

Referring to the EDL definition

```
edl "c:\malware\kazaa.edl"
```

Primitive data types

```
map ipaddr
```

```
string blocked = "cydoor|doubleclick|adserver|..."
```


Policy specification

```
match gethostbyname(name) -> allow  
  << addHash(ipaddr, ret, name)>>
```

```
match connect(addr, socket,  
  << isHashed(addr) >> ) -> deny
```

```
match connect(sockaddr, socket,  
  << regex(blocked, gethostbyaddr(sockaddr) >> )  
  -> deny
```

# Slicing Results (Kazaa)



# Performance Results

## Runtime Overhead

	W/O Logging	With Logging
SSH Client	21%	97%
RealOne Player	0.8%	1.7%
Kazaa	2.7%	5.9%
Original	0%	0%


## Memory Overhead

	Text	Data	Total
SSH Client	94KB	42KB	136KB
RealOne Player	94KB	42KB	136KB
Kazaa	94KB	45KB	139KB
Original	62KB	7KB	69KB


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# Model-Based Intrusion Detection



# Model-Based Intrusion Detection



# Model-Based Intrusion Detection

