

Playing Inside the Blackbox: Using Dynamic Instrumentation to Create Security Holes

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Overview

1. How to easily do dangerous and malicious things to a running program.
2. How to detect when someone does something evil to your program.

A New View

Running programs are objects to be easily manipulated. Kinds of manipulations might include:

Instrumentation

Optimization

Control



The Vehicle: The DynInst API

A **machine-independent** library for machine level code patching.

- Eases the task of building new tools.
- Provides the basic abstractions to patch code on-the-fly

Dynamic Instrumentation

- Does not require recompiling or relinking
 - Saves time: compile and link times are significant in real systems.
 - Can instrument without the source code (e.g., proprietary libraries).
 - Can instrument without linking (relinking is not always possible).


- Instrument optimized code.

Dynamic Instrumentation (con'd)

- ❑ Only instrument what you need, when you need
 - No hidden cost of latent instrumentation.
 - Enables "one pass" tools.

- ❑ Can instrument running programs:
 - Servers.
 - Application programs.
 - Systems with complex start-up procedures.

The Basic Mechanism



The DynInst Interface

- ❑ Machine independent representation
- ❑ Object-based interface to build Abstract Syntax Trees (AST's)
- ❑ Write-once, instrument-many (portable)
- ❑ Hides most of the complexity in the API
 - Process Hijacker: only 700 lines of user code!
 - MPI tracer: 250 lines

Basic DynInst Operations

□ Process control:

- Attach/create process
- Monitor process status changes
- Callbacks for fork/exec/exit

□ Image (executable program) routines:

- Find procedures/modules/variables
- Call graph (parent/child) queries
- Intra-procedural control-flow graph

Basic DynInst Operations

- Inferior (application processor) operations:
 - **Malloc/free**
 - Allocate heap space in application process
 - **Inferior RPC**
 - Asynchronously execute a function in the application.
 - **Load module**
 - Cause a new .so/.dll to be loaded into the application.

Basic DynInst Operations

□ Inferior operations (continued):

- **Remove Function Call**
 - Disable an existing function call in the application
- **Replace Function Call**
 - Redirect a function call to a new function
- **Replace Function**
 - Redirect all calls (current and future) to a function to a new function.

Basic DynInst Operations

□ Building AST code sequences:

- Control structures: if and goto
- Arithmetic and Boolean expressions
- Get PID/TID operations
- Read/write registers and global variables
- Read/write parameters and return value
- Function call

Security Applications of DynInst

Lots of tool applications of Dyninst by lots of groups.

Here are two security-oriented ones:


- ❑ License server bypassing
- ❑ Condor security attacks

Condor Attack: Lurking Jobs


- ❑ Condor schedules jobs on idle workstations
- ❑ In a normal mode, jobs run as a common, low-privilege user ID: "nobody".
- ❑ This common user ID provides an opportunity for an evil lurking process to ambush subsequent jobs (from other users):



Condor Job Structure




Condor Job Structure



Condor Job Structure




Submitting Host




Execution Host


Condor Job Structure



Condor Job Structure



Condor Job Structure



Can We Trust a Remote Job?


The threats:

1. Cause the job to make improper remote system calls.
2. Cause the job to calculate an incorrect answer.
3. Steal data from the remote job.

Threat protection strategies:

- File sand-boxing (#1)
- System call sand-boxing (#1)
- Obscure and encode binary (#1)
- Replicate remote job (#2)


Sand-Boxing



Shadow process selectively rejects system calls:

- Restrict access to specific files or directories
- Disallow certain system calls
- Disallow certain system call parameter values

Obscuring the Executable



Obscuring the Executable

Goal:

Even if an intruder can see, examine, and fully control the remote job, no harm can come to the local machine.

How to Get a Copy of DynInst:

Release 2.3 (release 3.0 imminent)

- Free for research use.
- Runs on Solaris (SPARC & x86), Windows NT, AIX/SP2, Linux (x86), Irix (MIPS), Tru64 Unix (Alpha).

<http://www.paradyn.org>

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