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Flexible Session Management in a Distributed Environment

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Abstract.

Many secure communication libraries used by distributed systems, such as SSL, TLS, and Kerberos, fail to make a clear distinction between the authentication, session, and communication layers. In this paper we introduce CEDAR, the secure communication library used by the Condor High Throughput Computing software, and present the advantages to a distributed computing system resulting from CEDAR's separation of these layers. Regardless of the authentication method used, CEDAR establishes a secure session key, which has the flexibility to be used for multiple capabilities. We demonstrate how a layered approach to security sessions can avoid round-trips and latency inherent in network authentication. The creation of a distinct session management layer allows for optimizations to improve scalability by way of delegating sessions to other components in the system. This session delegation creates a chain of trust that reduces the overhead of establishing secure connections and enables centralized enforcement of system-wide security policies. Additionally, secure channels based upon UDP datagrams are often overlooked by existing libraries; we show how CEDAR's structure accommodates this as well. As an example of the utility of this work, we show how the use of delegated security sessions and other techniques inherent in CEDAR's architecture enables US CMS to meet their scalability requirements in deploying Condor over large-scale, wide-area grid systems.

1. Introduction

CEDAR is the communications and security library used in the Condor [6, 15] High-Throughput Computing software. CEDAR is a multi-platform C++ TCP and UDP network socket representation that offers several important features essential in a distributed environment. The cross-platform implementation allows a wide variety of architectures to easily communicate over a network while maintaining a very strong focus on security. CEDAR offers several improvements to overcome shortcomings with traditional UDP datagrams, and makes timeout management and error propagation first-class citizens which is essential in distributed computing. In this section we briefly introduce the salient CEDAR feature set.

Although CEDAR is used extensively by Condor and was developed primarily to support that role, it does exist as a standalone library and can be used outside of the Condor codebase. Applications can utilize it to quickly provide thorough cross-platform compatibility, a large variety of authentication and encryption methods, and advanced session management for better scalability.

1.1. Cross-platform Capabilities

Basic communication primitives are provided for sending integers, floating point values, strings, files, and other data structures. This is done in an architecture-independent representation which allows for differing sizes of core data types like integers and floating point values. Integers on different platforms may have different byte sizes and potentially have different byte ordering, requiring translation when two otherwise incompatible platforms communicate with each other. Furthermore, floating point values are translated between single and double precision. A `ClassAd`[10] is a data structure used heavily by the Condor HTC system[7], and the ability for CEDAR to send and receive `ClassAd` data structures as first-class entities is vital, allowing for great flexibility in wire protocols.

1.2. UDP Capabilities

Traditional UDP datagrams have many shortcomings that are addressed by CEDAR to increase UDP's usefulness in a typical distributed environment. CEDAR does not rely on the kernel to do packet fragmentation and reassembly, which has several advantages. Doing fragmentation and reassembly in user-space avoids using precious system kernel memory which is a small, static buffer and relatively limited resource, thus allowing a higher volume of UDP traffic without dropping packets. Furthermore, it allows for datagrams greater than 64 kilobytes (KB) in size, a UDP limitation that is easily exceeded by today's workloads. For example, a single `ClassAd` representing a job's environment could easily exceed 64 KB in size. Another advantage to CEDAR's packet fragmentation is that CEDAR can optimize the size of the fragments and introduce delays when sending them, which we have observed on many operating systems results in fewer lost packets. Finally, CEDAR adds security capabilities to UDP traffic, including authentication, encryption, and integrity checks, which for UDP are often overlooked in other security layer implementations such as SSL [5].

1.3. Timeout Management

In a distributed system where many components are communicating with one another, it is essential that the amount of time spent blocking on I/O operations is minimized, particularly if some of the connections are established over Wide Area Networks (WANs) as is typical in a grid environment. For this reason, CEDAR allows for carefully managing the timeouts for all I/O operations so that one process is never stuck indefinitely waiting for another. CEDAR does use non-blocking connects to avoid having processes sit idle, but to avoid having one component of the system wreak havoc in other parts, timeouts are used to break out of blocking I/O reads and writes in the event that one component has failed or is lagging behind for any reason.

1.4. Error Stack

Because a single failure at a low level can often cause a cascade of error conditions, CEDAR keeps an *error stack* instead of a single integer *errno* which is the conventional approach, thereby providing a richer method of propagating and reporting failures. This allows very detailed information on the root cause of the problem to be kept while each layer chooses to either handle the error and continue, or to add its own information to the error stack and propagate the stack to the next layer. Ultimately, this leads to a more detailed and hopefully more informative message that makes understanding both the high-level problem and low-level problem clear.

As an example, suppose a user was trying to query a Condor daemon and the security settings are setup to require GSI [4] authentication. However, the user does not have a valid proxy. Instead of a single "111 - connection refused" error, the user would get something much more descriptive, like:

111 – connection refused
1003 – authentication failed
5003 – GSI: unable to acquire credential
851968 – GLOBUS: no valid proxy file

Also, if an error is recoverable, any layer may pop the error off the stack, take corrective action, and continue.

1.5. Basic Security Features

Many basic security features essential for a distributed system are provided by CEDAR, including authentication, encryption, and integrity checks. There is also a layer for the negotiation of which security features are available and allowed for a given connection. Finally, there is a layer which maps users from their native credential to a canonical Condor identity and allows for authorization based on this identity. Currently in CEDAR the available authentication methods include authentication using the local file system, SSPI [2] (for Windows), password, Kerberos [14] (via Active Directory on Windows), GSI [4], and OpenSSL [1]. This variety of mechanisms allows strong authentication even between wildly different operating systems such as Linux and Windows. Integrity checks can be done with MD5 [11] while encryption can be done with either 3DES [3] or Blowfish [12]. Current development efforts are adding AES[9] and SHA-1[8] support.

When negotiating security features for a connection, it is the server (the side which receives the incoming connection) that has final say over which features are allowed and what the order of preference is. It is also the server's responsibility to perform the mapping from a security credential to canonical identity (user name), and inform the client which identity it ultimately was authenticated as.

2. Importance of Session Management

Capable network session management is critical to a highly scalable distributed system that needs secure connections. To understand why, consider OpenSSL and GSI. Both are authentication systems that make use of X.509 certificates, based on public-key infrastructure (PKI) technology. While they offer a cryptographically strong authentication, there are two significant drawbacks to using these methods exclusively: CPU overhead and network latency. CPU usage has minimal impact for a server handling only a few incoming connections, but can quickly become the major bottleneck as the scale of a distributed system increases. For the *condor_collector* service, which handles incoming connections from all compute nodes in a cluster, performing GSI authentication for many thousands of incoming connections can overwhelm a server. The latter concern of latency is a bigger issue, as quite often the network connections in a grid environment are established across a WAN. Authentication using GSI or OpenSSL requires several round trips across the network, which when combined with typical latencies over a WAN can result in delays on the order of 0.1 to 0.25 seconds.

Kerberos is another authentication protocol supported by Condor, but it also has potential bottlenecks. Kerberos relies on network connectivity to the centralized KDC service [14], which again will introduce latency and even worse, can become overloaded due to too many authentications occurring simultaneously. Therefore, it is necessary to minimize the number of actual authentications performed in order to enable a reasonable level of scalability.

This can be done by using a session management layer, which allows for a semi-permanent information exchange that is explicitly set up and torn down. The authentication is performed only once during the setup part, during which secret keys are also securely distributed to both the server and the client. These keys are then used to resume the session in the future, thus allowing the high cost of authentication to be paid only once for the duration of the conversation.

2.1. CEDAR Sessions

CEDAR implements its own session management layer, because of the delegation opportunities enabled with this approach (see below), and because we found session handling in other security libraries to be lacking. For instance, OpenSSL also provides session management, but cannot support sessions established via authentication mechanisms other than SSL. In addition, OpenSSL alone also does not address the authentication of UDP packets and the ability to use sessions over UDP. Finally, OpenSSL sessions do not store as much state as Condor would like, such as the mapped canonical name and the authorization policy used to establish the connection.

The CEDAR session management layer is highly stateful and records several important pieces of information about the session, including who the connection claims to be, where it originated from, how it was authenticated, which canonical user that credential maps to, how that user was authorized, and which types of encryption and integrity checks will be used for the connection. Using this extra data, many optimizations can be made, allowing the same session to be used for other purposes as long as the new purpose is also authorized by the policy used to create the original session. This further reduces the number of authentications and improves scalability.

After two entities make initial contact and authenticate each other with whatever method was negotiated, a session is created and an internal 192-bit session key is generated and distributed securely to each entity. It is the knowledge of this key that allows sessions to be resumed quickly and securely without re-authenticating each time. The keys have expiration dates after which the session is torn down and a new one must be created. The default lifetime for a session varies depending on the purpose of the connection, but is also configurable, and adjusting the session lifetime can impact the memory footprint of a running daemon by limiting the number of sessions cached in memory at any given point. A shorter lifetime will cause fewer sessions to be cached, which reduces the memory footprint but also increases the number of authentications performed to periodically reestablish new sessions.

2.2. Resuming a Session

Condor's session management is optimized for the common case of resuming an already established session. When resuming a session, Condor sends the session ID (and not the key itself of course) as part of the initial contact. Each entity looks up the session key using the session ID. The sending party uses the secret key to encrypt either the entire stream or at the very least the MD5 sum. The ability of the receiving side to decrypt the stream or MD5 sum proves they share the same secret key and therefore authenticates the resumed connection. Condor does not wait for confirmation that the session ID is valid, as this would require a network round trip. By optimizing for the common case, there are no additional round trips in resuming a session, and eliminating the round trip means there is no additional latency. This makes resuming a session very efficient, which is extremely important in constructing a scalable distributed system where the network connections are potentially made over a WAN with relatively high latency.

2.3. Invalid Sessions

Because Condor is optimized for the common case, in the event of an invalid session being resumed the server must notify the client out-of-band that the session is no longer valid. This instructs the client to destroy the invalid session and create a new one. This could happen for instance if the server was restarted for some reason (thus clearing the server's soft-state session cache) and the client is not. This causes the client to attempt to use an invalid session, resulting in the command being refused by the server. It is therefore critical that the client be notified reliably of an invalid session. For this reason, the message to invalidate a session is sent using TCP by default since UDP packets are unreliable.

3. Delegated Sessions

An important characteristic of CEDAR's session layer is the clean separation between network authentication and the establishment of a security session. In CEDAR, the authentication process results in the creation of a security session. Once established, this authenticated security session contains all information necessary to enable secure communications with no additional round-trips. Furthermore, this session state is serializable and transferable. By transferring the session state from one service to another that have established a trust relationship, a system using CEDAR is able to establish a secure communication channel between two entities that had not previously communicated.

For example, when the Condor system is matching jobs from a submit node to an execute node, the centralized Condor directory service must already communicate with both the nodes to perform matchmaking. By delegating the security session through these existing secure connections, Condor can establish a secure channel between the submit and execute nodes even though they have not previously authenticated to each other directly. This then allows them to communicate by resuming an existing session, the optimized common case, and avoid performing the expensive authentication. This is especially helpful because the queuing service on the submit node is typically where scalability is limited, and the limiting factor was often high-latency network authentications and somewhat heavy CPU utilization due to PKI. Delegating sessions enables this cost to be offloaded to a third-party machine.

Another advantage to delegating trust relationships in this manner is it allows two daemons to establish a secure channel even if they do not share a common authentication mechanism between them. For instance, GSI has not yet been implemented on Windows despite GSI being widely deployed on world-wide physics grids. By having the central directory service delegate sessions to the submit and execute nodes, systems with no common authentication methods can still be part of the same grid.

3.1. Advantages for UDP

Most common communication libraries overlook the implementation of security features for UDP datagrams. Enabling security features via UDP can be a challenge because it is connectionless and also has no delivery guarantees. However, because of CEDAR's flexible session management, a session set up on one connection can be reused for another connection, which allows CEDAR to provide the ability to send and receive secure UDP datagrams. A session must first be established using TCP, since that is the only way many authentication mechanisms can operate. If a session already exists between two communicating entities, there is then no additional overhead to using secure UDP. If one does not exist, CEDAR will automatically establish a session using TCP, incurring only the minimal overhead of a single authentication and secure key exchange. After establishing a session, CEDAR can then use the session to send secure UDP messages using the shared secret key in exactly the same way as a TCP session is resumed and authenticated. This technique adds no additional round trips on the network and thus sending a UDP datagram remains a one-way operation.

3.2. Experimental Results

The US CMS collaboration is using Condor glideins[13] to harvest Grid resources; the Condor collector and schedd are kept in a central location, while the Condor daemons responsible for job execution, the startds, are sent to the Grid resources to create a virtual-private Condor pool. GSI authentication is used for all inter-daemon communication.

The initial deployments used Grid resources located in the same region as the central services and the results were very good; Condor could easily handle 10000 glideins, with a 1 Hz global glidein turnaround rate (equal to the global glidein startup rate). However, when testing the scalability on Grid resources spread world-wide, Condor failed to scale beyond a few hundred

glideins. The network latencies were determined to be the root cause; Condor did not yet support the delegated sessions at that time.

Tests were performed over the wide area network, compared to the loopback device, and the following results were obtained (all times are in seconds):

	WAN	loopback
ping time	0.15	0.00006
bare GSI authentication (client)	0.43	0.15
bare GSI authentication (server)	0.74	0.15
CEDAR session setup with GSI (client)	1.0	0.15
CEDAR session setup with GSI (server)	1.2	0.16

The network latencies are a performance killer for single threaded products like the Condor daemons.

The first obvious bottleneck is the Condor daemon that keeps the state of the resource pool (the collector), since it does a lot of communication. In the US CMS setup, each glidein initiates four sessions at startup. US CMS mitigated the collector scalability problem by deploying multiple daemons, which was highly effective since collectors can be arranged in a tree fashion. Using a tree of 1 top-level and 70 second-tier collectors, the system was able to handle up to 25000 simultaneous glideins over a WAN, with a global glidein turnaround rate of up to 2.5Hz.

The other Condor daemon that is connection-intensive is the *condor_schedd*, which is the service that handles job submission, scheduling, and deployment to an execute machine. The schedd must handle multiple network connections with all execute nodes and also communicate with other Condor daemons when jobs start and end. While the schedds can also be replicated, they cannot be arranged in a tree structure; each schedd has to be independent. As such, from the usability point of view, it is desirable to use a single schedd.

The schedd scalability problem was addressed by using the delegated sessions. In this setup, only the collector needs to fully authenticate the parties (i.e the schedd and startds) and establish a security session. The schedd is then given the security session of the matched startd during the matchmaking process, thus making communication between the schedd and the startd very efficient. With this setup, the schedd easily handled 25000 running jobs in the above mentioned test.

4. Conclusion

This paper demonstrated how thoughtful network session management can enhance the performance of a large-scale distributed system. The demands of establishing and resuming a secure channel across administrative domains, multiple distributed services, and wide-area networks created the challenges that motivated the development of CEDAR. The mechanisms in CEDAR's design, outlined in this paper, have played a key role in allowing the Condor High Throughput Computing system to meet the large and dynamic workload of the US CMS experiment.

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