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Computer Security and Cryptography
Reading Group
October 2002 List

Date &
Location
Reading
1 Oct 2002
2310 CS
12 - 1 PM

Joysula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohargi, Helmut Scherzer, Stephane Tinguely
IBM Watson Research Center / Swiss Federal Institute of Technology

Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards

URL: http://www.research.ibm.com/intsec/gsm.ps

In this paper, we introduce a new class of side-channel attacks called partitioning attacks. We have successfully launched a version of the attack on several implementations of COMP128, the popular GSM authentication algorithm that has been deployed by different service providers in several types of SIM cards, to retrieve the 128 bit key using as few as 8 chosen plaintexts. We show how partitioning attacks can be used effectively to attack implementations that have been equipped with ad hoc and inadequate countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Such ad hoc countermeasures are systemic in implementations of cryptographic algorithms, such as COMP128, which require the use of large tables since there has been a mistaken belief that sound countermeasures require more resources than are available. To address this problem, we describe a new resource-efficient countermeasure for protecting table lookups in cryptographic implementations and justify its correctness rigorously.

7 Oct 2002
3331 CS
2:30 - 3:30 PM

Joint meeting with the PL reading group

David Wagner, Drew Dean
University of California, Berkeley / Xerox PARC

Intrusion Detection via Static Analysis

URL: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/ids-oakland01.pdf

One of the primary challenges in intrusion detection is modelling typical application behavior, so that we can recognize attacks by their atypical effects without raising too many false alarms. We show how static analysis may be used to automatically derive a model of application behavior. The result is a host-based intrusion detection system with three advantages: a high degree of automation, protection against a broad class of attacks based on corrupted code, and the elimination of false alarms. We report on our experience with a prototype implementation of this technique.

15 Oct 2002
1304 CS
12 - 1 PM

Paper # 1

Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, J.H. Reichman
University of Pittsburgh School of Law / Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, MIT / EFF / Vanderbilt Law School

A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs

URL: http://www.law.cornell.edu/commentary/intelpro/manifint.htm


Paper # 2

Randall Davis, Pamela Samuelson, Mithcell Kapor, Jerome Reichman
MIT / Cornell Law School / MIT / Vanderbilt University

A New View of Intellectural Property and Software

URL: http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/davis96new.html

22 Oct 2002
1304 CS
12 - 1 PM

Peter Szor, Eric Chien
Symantec AntiVirus Research Center

Blended Attacks Exploits, Vulnerabilities and Buffer-overflow Techniques in Computer Viruses
(presented at Virus Bulleting Conference 2002)

URL: http://www.peterszor.com/blended.pdf

Exploits, vulnerabilities, and buffer-overflow techniques have been used by malicious hackers and virus writers for a long time. However, until recently, these techniques were not common place in computer viruses. The CodeRed worm was a major shock to the antivirus industry since it was the first worm that spread not as a file, but solely in memory by utilizing a buffer overflow in Microsoft IIS. Many antivirus companies were unable to provide protection against CodeRed, while other companies with a wider focus on security were able to provide solutions to the relief of end users.

Usually new techniques are picked up and used by copy cat virus writers. Thus, many other similarly successful worms followed CodeRed, such as Nimda and Badtrans.

In this paper, the authors will not only cover such techniques as buffer overflows and input validation exploits, but also how computer viruses are using them to their advantage.

Finally, the authors will discuss tools, techniques and methods to prevent these blended threats.


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