

Identifying Variables in x86 Executables

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Motivation

- Code-inspection tools for security analysts
 - dependence-based navigation ("code surfing")
- Analyses for identifying
 - security vulnerabilities and bugs
 - malicious code
 - commonalities and differences
- Platform for
 - code obfuscation and de-obfuscation
 - de-compilation
 - installation of protection mechanisms
 - remediation of security vulnerabilities

Why Executables?

- Reflects actual behaviors that may arise
- Allows platform-specific artifacts to be taken into account
 - memory layout
 - register usage
 - execution order
 - compiler bugs
 - Thompson-style attack
- Source code hides the low-level (actual) behaviors that implement high-level abstractions
- Source-code analyses typically make unsafe assumptions (e.g., that the program is ANSI-C compliant)
 - loss of fidelity can allow vulnerabilities to escape notice

Puzzle	Standard prolog	Prolog for 1 local
int callee(int a, int b)	push ebp	push ebp
int local;	mov ebp, esp	mov ebp, esp
if (local == 5) return 1;	sub esp, 4	push ecx
else return 2;		
}		

Answer: 1
(for the Microsoft compiler)

```


int main() {
    int c = 5;
    int d = 7;

    int v = callee(c,d);
    // What is the value of v here?
    return 0;
}


```

mov [ebp+var_8], 5
mov [ebp+var_C], 7
mov eax, [ebp+var_C]
push eax
mov ecx, [ebp+var_8]
push ecx
call _callee
...

CodeSurfer/x86 Architecture



CodeSurfer/x86 Architecture




Scope

- Programs that conform to a "standard compilation model"
 - procedures
 - activation records
 - global data region
 - heap, etc.
- Report violations
 - violations of stack protocol
 - return address modified within procedure


Technical Challenges

- Distinguishing between code and data
 - Identifying variables
- Identifying parameters
 - Resolving indirect jumps
 - Resolving indirect calls
 - Identifying may-aliases



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Running Example

```
int arrVal=0, *pArray2;

int main() {
    int i, a[10], *p;
    /* Initialize pointers */
    pArray2 = &a[2];
    p = &a[0];
    /* Initialize Array */
    for(i = 0; i<10; ++i) {
        *p = arrVal;
        p++;
    }
    /* Return a[2] */
    return *pArray2;
}
```

```
; ebx ⇔ variable i
; ecx ⇔ variable p
sub esp, 40 ;adjust stack
lea edx, [esp+8];
mov [8], edx ;pArray2=&a[2]
lea ecx, [esp]; p=&a[0]
mov edx, [4];

loc_9:
    mov [ecx], edx ;*p=arrVal
    add ecx, 4 ;p++
    inc ebx ;i++
    cmp ebx, 10 ;i<10?
    jl short loc_9;

    mov edi, [8];
    mov eax, [edi]; return *pArray2
    add esp, 40
    retn
```

Running Example

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int arrVal=0, *pArray2;


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    ret
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
Running Example - Address Space



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    ret
```




Identifying Variables


- An abstraction of concrete memory configurations
 - Memory regions
- Infer layout of memory regions
 - A-locs (like variables)

Memory Regions

- An abstraction of concrete memory configurations
 - Idea: group similar runtime addresses
 - e.g., collapse the runtime ARs for each procedure, malloc-sites, global data




Example - Memory Regions




Infer Layout of Memory Regions

- Data-layout known at assembly/compile time
 - some variables held in registers
 - global variables → absolute addresses
 - local variables → offsets in stack frame
- A-locs
 - locations between consecutive addresses
 - locations between consecutive offsets
 - registers


Example - A-locs



Example - A-locs




Example - A-locs



Better Identification of Variables


- IDAPro A-locs
 - Based on explicitly specified addresses/offsets
- VSA provides access patterns for indirect operands
 - `ecx` → $(\perp, 4[0,9]-40)$



Aggregate Structure Identification

- Partition aggregates according to the program's memory-access patterns
 - original motivation: Y2K [Ramalingam et al. POPL 99]
- Uses in our context
 - improved identification of variables
 - identifies a better set of a-locs
⇒ better IR ⇒ fewer false alarms
 - recovery of type information
 - identifies structs and arrays
 - propagates type information from known parameter types (system calls & library functions)
⇒ better de-compilation

Aggregate Structure Identification



; ebx \leftrightarrow variable i
; ecx \leftrightarrow variable p


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lea ecx, [esp]; p=&a[0]
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```

loc_9:

```
mov [ecx], edx ;*p=arrVal
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cmp ebx, 10 ;i<10?
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mov edi, [4]; 
mov eax, [edi]; ;return *pArray2
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ret
```

Aggregate Structure Identification



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
```
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lea    edx, [esp+8]      ;
mov    [4], edx          ;pArray2=&a[2]
lea    ecx, [esp]         ;p=&a[0]
mov    edx, [0]           ;
```

loc_9:

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    mov    [ecx], edx      ;*p=arrVal
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    jl     short loc_9     ;
```

```
    mov    edi, [4]          ;
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    ret
```


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
ASI: two arrays;
one scalar

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
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Region for `main`

IDA Pro
one 8-byte a-loc
one 32-byte a-loc

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


High level type:


```
struct {  
    int a[2];  
    int b;  
    int c[7];  
};
```

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CodeSurfer/x86 Architecture



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Technical Challenges


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- fleshed-out *CFGs*
- fleshed-out call graph
- used, killed, may-killed variables for *CFG* nodes
- points-to sets
- reports of violations

CodeSurfer/x86 Architecture



Wrap Up

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 - dependence-based navigation ("code surfing")
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