

Vulnerability and Information Flow Analysis of COTS

Somesh Jha, Bart Miller, Tom Reps

{jha,bart,reps}@cs.wisc.edu

Computer Sciences Department

University of Wisconsin

1210 W. Dayton Street

Madison, WI 53706-1685



Cost of Software Development Motivates Use of COTS

- High cost of software development
 - increased complexity
 - increasing degree of concurrency
 - increasing quality-assurance demands
 - other factors . . .
- Increased deployment of COTS
- CIP/SW TOPIC #6
 - Protecting COTS from the inside

Advantages and Disadvantages of COTS


- Advantages
 - reduced cost
 - promotes modular design
 - partitions the testing effort
- Disadvantages
 - higher risk of vulnerabilities
 - general quality-assurance issues

Unsafe Malicious Code

- Viruses
 - Gain access through infected files
- Worms
 - Spread over the network
- Trojans
 - Hide harmful behavior under the guise of useful programs
- Most often: combined code
 - worm + virus + trojan
- Distinguishing characteristics: something observable happens

Malicious Code Example:


Internet worm Sobig.E



What Is Spyware?

- Spyware is software that
 - Is non-destructive (unlike a virus)
 - Operates in background—not easily observable
 - Is Often installed silently by other software
 - Usually integrated with desired functionality
- **Privacy-violating malicious code**
 - Provides useful functionality
 - But, “leaks” sensitive information

KaZaa in Operation




Spyware Summary

- Install a useful program
 - Play DVDs
- But ...
 - Also install "spy" software, which monitors user behavior
 - Example: Monitor web traffic
- Aureate Media, Real Networks
- Consult
 - <http://grc.com/optout.htm>
- Perhaps useful to advisors/managers 😊

WiSA: Don't Deploy COTS Without It

- We have proposed the Wisconsin Safety Analyzer
 - vulnerability and
 - Handles unsafe malicious code
 - information flow analysis of COTS
 - Handles privacy-violating malicious code (Spyware)
- Develop technology for static analysis of binaries
- Investigate applications

Trusted verification services



Benefits to DoD

- Reduces risk of deploying COTS
- Capable of discovering vulnerabilities in COTS
 - safety related
 - information-flow related
- Assign assurance levels to COTS components

WiSA Requirements

- Requirement 1

- cannot mandate that all COTS packages will be written in the same language
- source code for COTS frequently not available
.: analysis of binaries/multi-lingual techniques

- Requirement 2

- safety depends on context
- desire to specify
 - discretionary access control
 - mandatory access control
- .: need an expressive specification language

WiSA Requirements

- Requirement 3

- there are tradeoffs between scalability & precision
 - generally: efficiency vs. precision
 - but sometimes: more precise = more efficient
- ∴ tunable precision

- Requirement 4

- wish to analyze compositions of COTS packages
- ∴ rely-guarantee reasoning and reason about compositions of vulnerabilities and constructing attack graphs

Initial Focus

- Our initial focus is on analyzing **x86 binaries**
- Reasons
 - high impact
 - several viruses written for the x86 platform
 - rich language
 - several hard analysis issues will be dealt with
 - can reuse architecture and experience in other settings
- partially addresses requirement 1


IDA Pro

- Decompilation tool
- Supports several executable file formats like COFF, ELF
- Gather as much information as possible
 - e.g. Names of functions, parameters to functions
- Is extensible through a built-in C like language


Codesurfer

- A program understanding tool
- Analyzes the data and control dependencies
 - Stores in System Dependence Graph (SDG)
 - Helpful in static analysis
- Provides an API to access the information stored in SDG
- The API can be extended


Architecture




Code Generation




Dynamic Buffer Overflow Detection




Malicious Code Detection




Static Buffer Overflow Detection



Value Set Analysis



Specification-Based Monitoring



Students Supported

- Gogul Balakrishnan
 - Advisor: Tom Reps
 - Going to take his qualifiers in the fall
- Mihai Christodorescu
 - Advisor: Somesh Jha
 - Passed his qualifiers (PL)
 - Prelim soon
- Vinod Ganapathy
 - Advisor: Somesh Jha
 - Passed his qualifiers (PL)

Students Supported (Contd.)

- Jon Giffin
 - Advisors: Somesh Jha and Bart Miller
 - Passed his qualifier (OS)
 - Prelim soon
- Hong Lin
 - Advisor: Bart Miller
 - Going to take her qualifier in the fall
- Hao Wang
 - Advisor: Somesh Jha
 - Passed his qualifier (OS)

Papers

- S. Jha and T. Reps, Analysis of SPKI/SDSI certificates using model checking, *Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW)*, June 2002.
- J. Giffin, S. Jha, and B. Miller, Detecting manipulated remote call streams, *Usenix Security Symposium*, August 2002.
- S. Schwoon, S. Jha, T. Reps, and S. Stubblebine, On generalized authorization problems, *Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW)*, 2003.

Papers

- M. Christodorescu and S. Jha, Static analysis of executables to detect malicious patterns, *Usenix Security Symposium*, August 2003.
- Four papers under submission
- Mihai's work is being patented
- Many more coming ...

Technology Transfer

- Main vehicles for technology transfer
 - Grammatech
 - Tim Tietelbaum and David Melski will talk about this
 - NRL
 - Connie Hietmeyer is planning to visit UW-Madison
 - I am planning to visit her sometime in the fall
 - CERT and other such organizations
 - Disseminate bugs and vulnerabilities found
 - Hopefully ...
 - Many other research projects have expressed interest in the infrastructure

Contact Information

- Prof. S. Jha
 - email: jha@cs.wisc.edu
- Prof. B. Miller
 - email: bart@cs.wisc.edu
- Prof. T. Reps
 - email: reps@cs.wisc.edu
- Computer Sciences Dept.
1210 West Dayton Street
Madison, WI 53706

Project home page
<http://www.cs.wisc.edu/wisa>