Playing Inside the Blackbox: Using Dynamic Instrumentation to Create Security Holes

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Overview

1. How to easily do dangerous and malicious things to a running program.

2. How to detect when someone does something evil to your program.
A New View

Running programs are objects to be easily manipulated. Kinds of manipulations might include:

- Instrumentation
- Optimization
- Control
The Vehicle: The DynInst API

A machine-independent library for machine level code patching.

- Eases the task of building new tools.
- Provides the basic abstractions to patch code on-the-fly.
Dynamic Instrumentation

❑ Does not require recompiling or relinking
  • Saves time: compile and link times are significant in real systems.
  • Can instrument without the source code (e.g., proprietary libraries).
  • Can instrument without linking (relinking is not always possible).

❑ Instrument optimized code.
Dynamic Instrumentation (con’d)

- Only instrument what you need, when you need
  - No hidden cost of latent instrumentation.
  - Enables “one pass” tools.

- Can instrument running programs:
  - Servers.
  - Application programs.
  - Systems with complex start-up procedures.
The Basic Mechanism

Application Program

Function foo

Trampoline

Pre-Instrumentation

Relocated Instruction

Post-Instrumentation
The DynInst Interface

- Machine independent representation
- Object-based interface to build Abstract Syntax Trees (AST's)
- Write-once, instrument-many (portable)
- Hides most of the complexity in the API
  - Process Hijacker: only 700 lines of user code!
  - MPI tracer: 250 lines
Basic DynInst Operations

❑ Process control:
  • Attach/create process
  • Monitor process status changes
  • Callbacks for fork/exec/exit

❑ Image (executable program) routines:
  • Find procedures/modules/variables
  • Call graph (parent/child) queries
  • Intra-procedural control-flow graph
Basic DynInst Operations

- Inferior (application processor) operations:
  - **Malloc/free**
    - Allocate heap space in application process
  - **Inferior RPC**
    - Asynchronously execute a function in the application.
  - **Load module**
    - Cause a new .so/.dll to be loaded into the application.
Basic DynInst Operations

- Inferior operations (continued):
  - Remove Function Call
    - Disable an existing function call in the application
  - Replace Function Call
    - Redirect a function call to a new function
  - Replace Function
    - Redirect all calls (current and future) to a function to a new function.
Basic DynInst Operations

- Building AST code sequences:
  - Control structures: if and goto
  - Arithmetic and Boolean expressions
  - Get PID/TID operations
  - Read/write registers and global variables
  - Read/write parameters and return value
  - Function call
Security Applications of DynInst

Lots of tool applications of Dyninst by lots of groups.

Here are two security-oriented ones:

- License server bypassing
- Condor security attacks
Condor Attack: Lurking Jobs

- Condor schedules jobs on idle workstations
- In a normal mode, jobs run as a common, low-privilege user ID: “nobody”.
- This common user ID provides an opportunity for an evil lurking process to ambush subsequent jobs (from other users):
Condor Job Structure

- Shadow Process
- User Job

Submitting Host → system calls ← Execution Host
Condor Job Structure

- Shadow Process
- Submitting Host
- system calls
- Evil User Job
- Execution Host
- fork
- Lurker Process
- fork
Condor Job Structure

Submitting Host

Execution Host

Lurker Process
Condor Job Structure

- Shadow Process
- Innocent User Job
- Lurker Process

Submitting Host

Execution Host

system calls
Condor Job Structure

- Shadow Process
- Innocent User Job
- Lurker Process

Submitting Host

Execution Host

system calls

attach
Condor Job Structure

- **Shadow Process**
  - `rm -rf *`

- **Innocent User Job**

- **Lurker Process**

- **Submitting Host**

- **Execution Host**

- System calls flow from **Submitting Host** to **Execution Host**.

- Control remote system calls from **Execution Host** to **Submitting Host**.

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Can We Trust a Remote Job?

The threats:
1. Cause the job to make improper remote system calls.
2. Cause the job to calculate an incorrect answer.
3. Steal data from the remote job.

Threat protection strategies:
- File sand-boxing (#1)
- System call sand-boxing (#1)
- Obscure and encode binary (#1)
- Replicate remote job (#2)
Sand-Boxing

Shadow Process \(\rightarrow\) system calls \(\rightarrow\) User Job

Submitting Host \(\rightarrow\) Execution Host

Shadow process selectively rejects system calls:

- Restrict access to specific files or directories
- Disallow certain system calls
- Disallow certain system call parameter values
Obscuring the Executable

User Job

Modifier/Obscurer

Checking Shadow

Modified User Job
Obscuring the Executable

Goal:

Even if an intruder can see, examine, and fully control the remote job, no harm can come to the local machine.
How to Get a Copy of DynInst:

Release 2.3 (release 3.0 imminent)

• Free for research use.
• Runs on Solaris (SPARC & x86), Windows NT, AIX/SP2, Linux (x86), Irix (MIPS), Tru64 Unix (Alpha).

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