

Model Checking for Binaries

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
Virus Scanning

- Viruses
 - Likely to become a bigger problem in the future
- Virus scanners
 - Check binaries for each type of virus
 - Virus signatures

Virus Scanners

Scanning

Executable



match?

match?

match?

Signature for Virus A

Signature for Virus B

Signature for Virus C

Clean/
Infected

Update

New
Virus D

Signature for Virus D

Virus Scanner Limitations

- Signatures are sequences of instructions
 - Small changes to infected program do not trigger a match

Virus Signature

```
mov [eax + 0Ch], ebx  
mul edx, [ebp + FFh]  
add ebp, 2
```


~~match~~

Infected Program

```
mov [eax + 0Ch], ebx  
nop  
mul edx, [ebp + FFh]  
test ebx  
beqz next  
next:  
add ebp, 2
```

Is It Really A Problem?


- Yes!
 - Virus writers are getting smarter
 - Viruses are better at hiding themselves




What to do?

- Build a better mouse trap!
- Better detection tool
 - Use static analysis information
 - More flexible

=> Smart Virus Scanner



[Demo 1](#)



[Demo 2](#)



[Demo 3](#)

Smart Virus Scanner

1. Build a model of the virus code
 - Blueprint of virus behavior
 2. Verify that program does not match the blueprint
- More powerful


Smart Virus Scanner Example

Virus Signature:

```
mov [eax + 0Ch], ebx  
mul edx, [ebp + FFh]  
add ebp, 2
```




Virus Model:



Smart Virus Scanner Example

Virus Model:




Program to be checked:

```
next:    mov [eax + 0Ch], ebx  
        nop  
        mul edx, [ebp + FFh]  
        test ebx  
        beqz next  
        add ebp, 2
```

Model Checking

- Technique for checking program properties
- Build a “model program” that obeys the property
- Compare the program against the model


Model Checking



Security Automaton proposed by [Schneider 1999].


Model Checking

- Security Automaton
 - For policy "Always release a resource after acquiring it."




Model Checking

- Abstract Representation



Model Checking for Binaries



IDA Pro
(+ SDK
plugins)

Transducer
(on top of
CodeSurfer
static
analysis
engine)


Model Checker

Current Status

- Transducer
 - Works on sequences of instructions (basic blocks) to build the abstract representation
 - Uses only the static analysis information provided by CodeSurfer

Current Status

- Model Checker
 - Intra-procedural only



Static Analysis and Model Checking

- More (precise) information from static analysis can enhance model checking
- Smart Virus Scanner
 - "irrelevant" instructions - better identified by alias/points-to analysis

Future Directions

- Context-sensitive model checking
- Better static analyses
- Model checking for component systems

References

- Schneider, F.B. *Enforceable Security Policies*. TR99-1759, July 27, 1999.
- Dawson Engler, Benjamin Chelf, Andy Chou, and Seth Hallem. *Checking System Rules Using System Specific, Programmer-Written Compiler Extensions*. In Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, San Diego, CA, October 2000.
<http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/engler00checking.html>