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COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY IN
WEAK THEORIES OF ARITHMETIC

by

Deborah Joseph
and
Paul Young

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Deborah Joseph
Computer Science Department
1210 West Dayton St.
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706 USA

Paul Young
Computer Science Department, FR 35
University of Washington
Seattle, WA USA

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Deborah Joseph
Computer Science Department
University of Wisconsin
1210 West Dayton St.
Madison, WI 53706 USA

Paul Young
Computer Science Department, FR 35
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195 USA

ABSTRACT

In spite of the fact that much effort has been expended trying to prove lower bounds for algorithms and trying to solve the P = NP question, only limited progress has been made. Although most computer scientists remain convinced that solutions will be found, others (Hartmanis and Hopcroft, Fortune, Leivant and O'Donnell, and Phillips) have questioned the adequacy of Peano arithmetic for computer science. This uncertainty has only been increased by the recent work of Paris and Harrington showing that certain simple, finitistic, combinatorial statements are in fact independent of Peano Arithmetic. In this paper we survey complexity theoretic statements that are known to be independent of arithmetic theories. In addition we survey recent results analyzing the arithmetic quantifier structure of computational problems.

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1. Introduction

It has been fifty years since Gödel showed that Peano arithmetic is inadequate for a complete analysis and understanding of arithmetic and all its attendant branches of mathematics (including computer science). In the intervening years, mathematicians have come to believe and accept that, in spite of Gödel's work, most arithmetic problems of real interest can in fact be handled by Peano arithmetic. Computer scientists, whose mathematical training has largely been from this same school, have thus been convinced that Peano arithmetic provides an adequate formal tool for analysis of their programming languages and problems. However, in spite of the fact that a great deal of effort has been expended trying to prove lower bounds for algorithms and trying to solve the P = NP question, only limited progress has been made.\(^1\) Although most computer scientists remain convinced that solutions will be found, others (Hartmanis and Hopcroft [26], Fortune, Leivant and O'Donnell [15], [44], [55], [16], and Phillips [61]) have questioned the adequacy of Peano arithmetic for computer science. This uncertainty has only been increased by the recent work of Paris and Harrington [56], [58], showing that certain simple, finitistic, combinatorial statements are in fact independent of Peano Arithmetic. In this paper we survey complexity theoretic statements that are known to be independent of arithmetic theories. In addition we survey recent results analyzing the arithmetic quantifier structure of computational problems.

2. Independence Results for Peano Arithmetic

In the early 1900's many mathematicians were interested in obtaining a complete axiom system for all of mathematics. A variety of formal axiom systems were introduced. Despite the fact that Gödel later showed that all of mathematics can not be uniformly axiomatized, many of these formal systems have been very useful for proving theorems in various branches of mathematics. One such formal system is Peano arithmetic. Today it is generally believed that all of the theorems of real interest pertaining to arithmetic and finitary combinatorics can be proved using Peano arithmetic. For this reason most computer scientists believe that Peano arithmetic is an adequate formal system for resolving questions concerning program behavior and complexity.\(^2\) In this paper we will survey results that question whether Peano arithmetic and certain

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1. A notable exception is the recent result of Paul, Pippenger, Szeméredi and Trotter, [60], showing that nondeterministic and deterministic linear time are not equal.
2. The recent results of Paris and Harrington, [58], [56], Fortune, Leivant and O'Donnell, [15], [44], [55], [16], which we discuss later, cast some doubt on this belief.
other formal systems that are weaker than Peano arithmetic are adequate for resolving questions of program behavior and complexity. For this reason we will be discussing statements that are independent of these formal systems. (A statement is independent of a theory T if it is expressible in the language of T but neither it nor its negation is provable from T. If a statement is independent of a theory T, then the theory T is inadequate for resolving its truth or falsity.) If natural statements concerning program behavior are independent of Peano arithmetic or various other arithmetic theories, then those theories are inadequate for answering natural questions concerning program behavior.

Independence results can be proved using two fairly distinct techniques. Historically, independence proofs for arithmetic theories were primarily proof theoretic in nature and involved a detailed arithmetization of the proof theory for the theories. Although many of the more recent results have also been proof theoretic, they tend to rely on results arising from the earlier arithmetizations that established bounds on how rapidly functions can grow and still be provably total. Examples of this approach are the results of Paris and Harrington [58] showing that an extension to Ramsey's theorem is independent of Peano arithmetic and the results of Fortune, Leivant and O'Donnell [15], [44], [55], [16], showing that the termination theorem for certain strongly-typed programming languages is independent of Peano arithmetic. A second technique for proving statements independent is model theoretic and involves constructing one model of arithmetic in which the independent statement is true and a second model in which it is false. Considerable work concerning model theoretic techniques for obtaining arithmetic independence results has been done by Kirby and Paris [38] and is discussed briefly below. Many of the results that we discuss later will be proved using model theoretic techniques.

For background we begin with a brief discussion of some of the more important early independence results for Peano arithmetic.

2.1. Gödel's Theorems

In 1900 Hilbert, [28], posed the problem of whether a complete axiomatization could be given for mathematics. At that time he and many other mathematicians believed that there should be a sound and complete set of axioms from which all the true statements of mathematics could be derived. In 1931 Gödel showed that this is not the case. In his paper, "On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I", [17], Gödel showed that for any theory containing very minimal arithmetic axioms there are sentences that are true but unprovable:
Theorem (Gödel): In every consistent formal system that contains a certain amount of
finitary number theory, there exist undecidable propositions [neither they nor their
negations are provable]. Moreover, the consistency of any such system cannot be
proved within the system.

Although Gödel's theorem showed the impossibility of finding a set of axioms from
which all the true theorems of arithmetic could be derived, until very recently no
naturally occurring true statements about finitary arithmetic had been found that
could not be proven from the Peano axioms, an axiomatic system which is more than
adequate for applying Gödel's theorem.

Gödel's proofs of these results were proof theoretic in nature and involved a
lengthy arithmetization of the proof theory for arithmetic.

Other independence results that are important for historical reasons include
those following from the proof of Ryll-Nardzewski, [85], showing that Peano arithmetic
is not finitely axiomatizable. Among other reasons, these results are important
because they use purely model theoretic techniques. The proofs construct nonstan-
dard models to show that for any finite class of axioms for Peano arithmetic there are
induction axioms that are independent of the axioms.

2.2. Ramsey's Theorem

As mentioned above, the result of Paris and Harrington, [58], [56], is startling
because it represents perhaps the first example of a naturally occurring, nonme-
tamathematical, statement about the natural numbers that is true but not provable
from Peano arithmetic. Their result is that a simple extension of the finite version of
Ramsey's theorem, [83], is independent of Peano arithmetic. The standard finite ver-
sion of Ramsey's theorem is the following:

Theorem (Ramsey): For all natural numbers e, r, k there is an integer M such that, if
all of the e-element subsets of M are partitioned into r disjoint classes then there is a
homogeneous subset of M of size at least k. (By homogeneous we mean that all of its
e-element subsets were placed in the same r-class.)

The extension to Ramsey's theorem that Paris and Harrington show is independent
of Peano arithmetic is obtained by requiring that the homogeneous set be relatively
large, where relatively large means that the cardinality of the set is greater than its
minimal element.

This result has had considerable impact for two reasons: First, it has caused
mathematicians and computer scientists, whose work is often combinatorial, to
question whether other fairly natural combinatorial statements may be independent of Peano arithmetic. Second, Paris' proof, [56], is essentially model theoretic. Thus the proof has sparked a new interest among mathematicians and computer scientists in the use of nonstandard models. For example, some of the ideas used by Lipton, [45] arise naturally from the work of Kirby and Paris, [38], that developed the model theoretic techniques initially used ([56], [50]) for obtaining Ramsey independence results.

2.3. The Impact of Independence Results on Computer Science

Independence results in computer science have a history that goes back more than fifteen years (Fischer [14], Young [72], Hartmanis [25], Hartmanis and Hopcroft [26], Gordon [20], and Phillips [61]). The notion of a provably recursive function was introduced by Kreisel as early as 1952, [41]. In a somewhat later paper, [42], Kreisel showed that the recursive functions provably total using Peano arithmetic are exactly the same as those provably total using intuitionistic or Heyting arithmetic [27]. In [14] Fischer studied the class of provably recursive functions in detail and compared them with the class of total recursive functions. Somewhat later Young, [72], studied optimization among provably equivalent programs and showed that questions of speed-up and optimality are dependent, not on the function computed, but instead on the particular program that is chosen to compute the given function. Later Gordon, [20], and Baker, [2], studied properties of complexity classes of provably recursive functions and analogs of the $P=NP$ problem for provably polynomial (deterministic and nondeterministic) programs.

The first paper that explicitly investigated independence results relating to computer science was presented by Hartmanis and Hopcroft, [26]. They showed that the Godel incompleteness results for arithmetic could be coded into many problems of interest to computer scientists. Specifically, their paper contains the following results (for $F$ any formal system adequate to prove the Godel incompleteness results):

Theorem (Hartmanis and Hopcroft): For every $F$ we can effectively construct an $i$ such that $\varphi_i$ is recursive and $P^\#F = NP^\#F$ can be neither proved nor disproved in $F$.

Theorem (Hartmanis and Hopcroft): For every such $F$, there exists an algorithm (which can be explicitly given) whose running time is $n^2$, but there is no proof in $F$ that it runs

3. Recently, Kirby and Paris, [39], have shown that a simply described (and computable) number theoretic function introduced by Goodstein, [19], is not provably recursive. A nice discussion of this is given by Gichon, [8].
in time $< 2^n$.

Calude and Păun, [7], extended these results by explicitly constructing instances of the totality, finiteness and halting problems that are independent of $F$.

Although the results of Hartmanis, Hopcroft, Calude and Păun show that there are statements of apparent interest to computer scientists that are independent of Peano arithmetic, none of these early papers relating independence results to computer science produced results that could be described as surprising: All of the results were obtained by straightforward diagonalizations and by coding standard Gödel undecidable sentences into questions of computer science. The resulting programs and problems could hardly be expected to arise in practice or to give insight into real problems. A fact that is nicely illustrated by results of Hajek [22], [23] and Grant [21] showing quite clearly that such codings of incompleteness results give little or no insight into the independence of $P =? NP$ from Peano arithmetic.

2.4. The Termination Theorem for Polymorphic Typed Programming Languages

In [55], O'Donnell presented the first natural example of a statement concerning programming languages that is true but unprovable using Peano arithmetic. This work has subsequently been extended by Fortune [15], Leivant [44], O'Donnell [16], and Statman, [88]. They show that for certain strongly-typed programming languages similar to CLU, ALPHARD, MODEL and RUSSELL, the question of program termination for programs which in less sophisticated languages would be trivial straight-line code is independent of second order Peano arithmetic. The results begin by observing the

**Termination Theorem:** Every program containing only total operations and nonrecursive function definitions and applications is total.

They then go on to prove

**Theorem** (Fortune, Leivant & O'Donnell): The Termination Theorem for the Polymorphic Typed Programming Language is independent of second order Peano arithmetic.

The implication of this work is twofold: First, if languages become too sophisticated, verification of simple correctness may become literally impossible unless increasingly sophisticated formal systems are available. Second, the theorem reinforces the view expressed earlier by Hartmanis and Hopcroft that Peano arithmetic may be inadequate for solving some of the long-standing open questions of computer science.

4. Additional work on logics for reasoning about programs using nonstandard models has been done by Andreeka, Nemeti and Sain, [2], [3].
science.

The proof of Fortune, Leivant and O'Donnell is proof theoretic and uses the same sort of techniques as those used by Paris and Harrington in [58]: O'Donnell et al show that a universal function for the polymorphic typed programs that contain only total operations and nonrecursive function definitions and applications must grow faster than any function that is provably total in second order Peano arithmetic. This work has recently been extended by Statman [68], who has characterized the functions computable by polymorphic typed programs as exactly those functions provably total using second order arithmetic.

2.5. P =? NP and Models of Arithmetic

Recently, Dimitracopoulos and Paris [57] have used model theoretic techniques to investigate the possible independence of computational statements. They show that the P = NP and NP = coNP questions are related to certain natural problems concerning definability in nonstandard models of complete arithmetic. For example, they show that P = NP if and only if there is a nonstandard model of arithmetic in which elements are "equivalent" whenever they cannot be distinguished by any standard polynomial time program. Additional work on sufficient conditions for P = NP to be consistent with Peano arithmetic has been done by Kowalcyk, [40].

3. Complexity Theory and Weak Arithmetic Theories

The independence results surveyed in the preceding section were primarily concerned with Peano arithmetic and its extensions. Computer scientists have recently given considerable attention to the study of formal systems that are weaker than Peano arithmetic. Although it is undoubtedly true that independence results for full Peano arithmetic are of primary importance, weaker fragments of arithmetic seem to be more tractable, and perhaps as a result, there is a rapidly growing body of work relating complexity-theoretic results to such fragments. Most of the systems studied are not rich enough to prove all of the theorems that interest computer scientists. Nevertheless computational complexity theoretic independence results for these systems are of interest for a variety of reasons: (i) for better understanding exactly how

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5. Complete arithmetic is the theory that has as axioms all of the true sentences about addition and multiplication on the natural numbers.

6. This point is disputed in a recent dissertation by Marker, [48]. He shows that any Turing degree coding nonstandard models of DeMillo and Lipton's theory PT, must lie above 0'.
powerful proof tools must be in computer science, (ii) for classifying the proof-theoretic complexity of results in computer science, and (iii) as precursors for independence results either for richer axiom systems or for more interesting statements. In addition, for some of these weak theories the independence of specific computational statements is equivalent to their independence from full Peano arithmetic. This is because several of these theories include in their axioms all of the true or provable arithmetic sentences that have very restricted quantifier structure (at most one alternation of quantifiers). Many important open questions of computer science can be expressed by such simple sentences. For example, the formal sentence which asserts that "P = NP" is of the form \((\exists y)(\forall x)S(x,y)\) where \(S\) involves only bounded quantifiers. Similarly, the formal sentence that asserts that "P \neq NP" is of the form \((\forall x)(\exists y)R(x,y)\) with \(R\) involving only bounded quantifiers. Statements asserting the equivalence or inequivalence of NP and coNP also have a fairly simple form. Analyzing the quantifier structure of these computational statements is dependent on obtaining suitable arithmetic characterizations of sets in NP, and considerable work in this area already exists:

3.1. Quantifier Structure of Sets in NP and coNP

Some of the earliest work on arithmetically characterizing sets in the class NP was done by Adleman and Manders [1]. They showed that:

i) If membership in a set \(S\) is expressible by a Diophantine predicate in the form:

\[
    n \in S \iff (\exists y_1; \mid y_1 \mid \leq p(\mid n \mid)) \ldots (\exists y_k; \mid y_k \mid \leq p(\mid n \mid))[P_S(n;y_1,\ldots,y_k) = 0]
\]

where \(p\) and \(P_S\) are polynomials, then \(S \in \text{NP}\).

ii) If \(S \in \text{NP}\), then membership in \(S\) can be expressed by the Diophantine predicate:

\[
    n \in S \iff (\exists y_1; \mid y_1 \mid \leq q(\mid n \mid)) \ldots (\exists y_m; \mid y_m \mid \leq q(\mid n \mid))[Q_S(n;y_1,\ldots,y_m) = 0]
\]

where \(q\) and \(Q_S\) are polynomials.

In somewhat later work Stockmeyer [69] and Wrathall [71] considered the classes
of sets definable in the form:

\[ n \in S \iff (\exists y_1 \leq p_1(|n|)) \cdots (\exists y_k \leq p_k(|n|)) \]

\[ [P_L(n,y_1, \ldots, y_k)] \]

where the quantifiers alternate and the matrix of the expression, \( P_L(n,y_1, \ldots, y_k) \), is a predicate computable in polynomial time. (Earlier Karp [36] had observed that the class NP is exactly the class of sets definable in this way using only one existential quantifier.) Although it is not known whether the sets definable by predicates of the form (3.1) form a hierarchy based on numbers of alternating quantifiers, it is known that such a hierarchy has more than one level iff \( P \neq \text{NP} \).

Recently, an exact arithmetic characterization of NP has been given by Kent and Hodgson [37]. They defined a class of predicates that they call the **Exponential Existential Bounded Arithmetical Predicates** and showed that the class NP is exactly the class of sets definable by Exponential Existential Bounded Arithmetical Predicates:

**Definition** (Kent and Hodgson): A set of natural numbers, \( S \), is said to be definable in **Exponential Existential Bounded Arithmetical form** if and only if,

\[ n \in S \iff \prod((\exists y_1 \leq 2^{p_1(|n|)}) \cdots (\exists y_k \leq 2^{p_k(|n|)})) \]

\[ (\forall z_1 \leq q_1(|n|)) \cdots (\forall z_m \leq q_m(|n|)) \]

\[ [P_S(n,y_1, \ldots, y_k, z_1, \ldots, z_m) = 0] \]

where \( p_i \) and \( q_i \) are polynomials and \( P_S \) is a polynomial and the \( \Pi \) in front of the quantifier prefix indicates that an arbitrary permutation of quantifiers is allowed.

A hierarchy of arithmetic predicates called the **Bounded Arithmetic Predicates** that is similar to the **Exponential Existential Bounded Arithmetical Predicates** was introduced by Harrow [24]:

**Definition** (Harrow): A set is defined by a **Bounded Arithmetic Predicate** if and only if

\[ n \in S \iff (\exists y_1 \leq p_1(n))(\forall y_2 \leq p_2(n)) \cdots (\forall y_k \leq p_k(n))(Q_{y_k+1} \leq p_{k+1}(n)) \]

\[ [P_S(n,y_1, \ldots, y_{k+1}) = 0] \]

Harrow showed that the **Bounded Arithmetic Predicates** define exactly the same class of sets as the **Rudimentary Predicates** (RUD) studied by Smullyan [87], by
Wrathall [71], and by others.

Extending these results, Wrathall [71], and independently Hicks and Meloud [54], showed that for a restricted class of Rudimentary Predicates called the Positive Rudimentary Predicates ($R^+$), $R^+ = RUD$ only if $NP = coNP$. (Additional results relating rudimentary predicates to complexity classes and classes of formal languages have been obtained by Nepomnjaschii, [53], [52], [54], Paris and Wilkie, [59], and Yu, [73].)

The above results show that the sets in $R^+$, RUD, NP and coNP can all be defined by formulas that have very restricted quantifier structure. Accordingly, one might expect weak theories that restrict the quantifier structure of their axioms to be useful in studying the relationship between these classes. Relationships between such weak theories and the $NP = ? coNP$ questions have been investigated by Wilkie and others.

3.2. NP and coNP in Weak Theories of Arithmetic

Wilkie [70] related the question of whether $NP = coNP$ to independence results for a weak arithmetic theory. He showed that if Matijasevic's theorem, [49], is provable in $PA^- + I\Sigma_0$ (Peano arithmetic with induction restricted to bounded formulas), then $NP = coNP$. The proof uses Adleman and Manders' result showing that the set of equations of the form

$$a \cdot x^2 + b \cdot y = c, \quad a, b, c > 0,$$

solvable on the natural numbers is NP-complete. Manders [47] has observed that the result can be strengthened to the system $PA^- + I\Sigma^*$ where $I\Sigma^*$ is the induction schema for formulae with bounded quantification of the form

$$(\forall x < 2^{[|y|]}, \quad (\exists x < 2^{[|y|]}, ) , \text{for} \ n \in N.)$$

A more model theoretic approach to the $NP = coNP$ problem was taken by DeMillo and Lipton [12]. They defined a weak theory of arithmetic, which they called the Theory of Polynomial Time ($PT$), and showed that $PT$ is rich enough to verify that $NP = coNP$ iff $P = NP$:

**Definition** (DeMillo and Lipton): The language of $PT$ includes symbols for all of the functions and predicates that are computable in polynomial time. The axioms of $PT$ are all true sentences of the form $(\exists x)(\forall y)A(x,y)$, where $A$ is quantifier free.

**Definition** (DeMillo and Lipton): A theory $T$ is said to **verify** that $NP = coNP$ if for each $S \in NP$, $T \vdash S \in coNP$.  

Theorem (DeMillo and Lipton): \( PT \) can verify \( NP = \text{coNP} \) if and only if \( P = NP \).

On close investigation one discovers that this result rests primarily on the fact that the only functions a theory such as \( PT \) can prove total are the functions defined by the terms or those defined by cases from the terms of the language. For \( PT \) these functions are essentially the standard polynomial time computable functions since specific symbols for each of these functions were explicitly added to the language of \( PT \).

A similar result relates the theory \( PT \) to the question of whether or not sets in \( NP \cap \text{coNP} \) are decidable in polynomial time:

Definition (DeMillo and Lipton): Let \( S \) be a fixed recursive set and let \( A(x,y) \) and \( B(x,y) \) be defined as follows:

\[
(\exists y)A(x,y) \iff x \in S \quad \text{and} \quad (\exists y)B(x,y) \iff x \notin S.
\]

Now let

\[
\Delta_S(A,B) = (\forall x)((\exists y)A(x,y) \text{ or } (\exists z)B(x,z)).
\]

Theorem (DeMillo and Lipton): Let \( S \in NP \cap \text{coNP} \). Then the following are equivalent:

\( S \in P \)

\( PT \vdash \Delta_S(A,B) \) for some \( A, B \) in the language of \( PT \).

Again, the proof of this theorem has little to do with \( NP \) or \( \text{coNP} \), but rather depends on the fact that essentially the only sets provably decidable using \( PT \) are the standard polynomially decidable sets. This fact is well illustrated in a paper by Homer and Reif, [30], where they generalize the results of DeMillo and Lipton to theories that contain symbols for other classes of functions.

Motivated by the work of DeMillo and Lipton, Huwig, [31], has investigated the \( P =? \) \( NP \) question within the category of idempotent, commutative semigroups. He shows that this category is rich enough to express a \( P =? \) \( NP \) question; what’s more within this category \( P = NP \). Thus the theory of idempotent, commutative semigroups is not rich enough to prove \( P \neq NP \). In contrast he shows that it is rich enough to carry out constructions such as the minimization of finite automata.

The results discussed in this section show that questions of provability in weak theories of arithmetic are related to computational questions such as whether \( P = NP \) and whether \( NP = \text{coNP} \). However questions of which computational problems are resolvable in weak theories of arithmetic and which complexity theoretic statements
are independent of such theories, are of interest in their own right. Explicit independence results and examples of complexity theoretic statements that are unprovable have been obtained for some weak theories, and we survey some of these results in the remaining two sections of this paper.

4. The Theory ET

One of the weakest fragments of arithmetic that has been used in studies of computational complexity is the theory ET (theory of Exponential Time) introduced by DeMillo and Lipton, [13]. The theory ET has as axioms all of the true universal sentences from the first order language,

\[ L(ET) = \{0, 1, +, *, - , \max(x,y), \min(x,y), 2^x, 3^x, \ldots, P_0(x), P_1(x), P_2(x), \ldots \} \]

where the \( P_i \) are new predicate symbols corresponding to each of the standard polynomially time computable relations. (By a universal sentence, we mean a sentence of the form \( \forall x_1 \forall x_2 \ldots \forall x_n S(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \) where \( S \) contains no quantifiers, either bounded or unbounded.)

DeMillo and Lipton add a new constant symbol \( a \) to the language of ET and define a new class of predicates, which we call \( P_{DEL} \), as follows:

(i): \( P_i \in P_{DEL} \) for all \( i \),

(ii): \( P_{DEL} \) is closed under Boolean operations,

and

(iii): If \( A(x) \in P_{DEL} \), then so does \( (\exists x < a) A(x) \).

Obviously, in the standard model, \( \mathbb{N} \) (the standard natural numbers), the constant symbol \( a \) can only be interpreted as a standard natural number, and of course each \( P_i \) can be correctly interpreted as the polynomially time testable relation that it is supposed to represent. Thus, in the standard model, for every interpretation of the constant symbol \( a \), all of the predicates in \( P_{DEL} \) are polynomially time testable. Furthermore, if we take any NP-complete set, for example SAT (the set of satisfiable Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal form), then it can be expressed as

\[ x \in SAT \iff (\exists y) S(x,y) \]

where \( S \) is a polynomially time testable predicate. Therefore in \( L(ET) \) there is an explicitly introduced predicate symbol \( P_S \) that represents \( S \). With this as motivation, we can now state the primary result of DeMillo and Lipton:
Theorem (DeMillo and Lipton): Let \( A \) be a quantifier free predicate in the language \( L(ET) \) such that \( \{x : (\exists y)A(x,y)\} \) is NP-complete. Then for some predicate \( \varphi(x) \in P_{D\&L} \),

\[
ET + (\forall x)[(\exists y)A(x,y) \iff \varphi(x)]
\]

is consistent.

Before applying this theorem to NP-complete sets, one should bear in mind the fact, mentioned earlier, that the sets in NP can be characterized as those sets definable by using Kent-Hodgson Exponential Existential Bounded Arithmetical Predicates. This characterization, along with one's general intuitions, makes it seem unlikely that many (or even any) of the NP-complete sets can be defined in any natural way by using arithmetical predicates that have no bounded-quantifiers.\(^7\). On the other hand, in the extended language \( L(ET) \) there is a (new) explicitly introduced predicate symbol \( P_R \) for each polynomially time testable relation \( R \). Therefore, for every NP-complete set, such as SAT, one can substitute the associated predicate symbol \( P_S \) that is in \( L(ET) \) in order to get the desired quantifier free predicates, \( A \), used in the above theorem. Since, in the standard model, all of the predicates, \( \varphi \), in \( P_{D\&L} \) are polynomially time testable, this theorem can be interpreted as saying that it is consistent with the axioms of \( ET \) to believe that \( P = NP \).

Although such an interpretation may be tempting, it is not entirely reasonable. Even in the language of Peano arithmetic there are obviously many different formal sentences which assert that \( P = NP \). Even for different natural sentences which assert that \( P = NP \), it is not clear that in theories as weak as \( ET \) that one can prove their equivalence. Additional difficulties arise with the predicate symbols \( P_i \). One such difficulty is the following: Although the axioms of \( ET \) are strong enough to guarantee that polynomial time testable predicates like \( S \) and their corresponding predicate symbols \( P_S \) agree in the standard model \( N \), (since each true instance, e.g., \( P_S(3) \) or \( \neg P_S(3) \) is an axiom of \( ET \)), arithmetical predicates like \( S \) may involve so much bounded quantification that the axioms of \( ET \) cannot guarantee that \( S \) and \( P_S \) agree in all models of \( ET \). In particular, it is not clear that there is any model of \( ET \) in which

\[
(\forall x)[(\exists y)P_S(x,y) \iff \varphi(x)]
\]

holds and at the same time \( P_S \) agrees with \( S \), which is the predicate it is supposed to

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\(^7\) Matijasevic's Theorem tells us that there is a characterization that does not involve bounded quantifiers, but not necessarily a natural one.
represent; i.e., it is not clear that there are any models of $ET$ in which the preceding formula holds and \( \{ x : (\exists y)P_S(x,y) \} \) "correctly" represents the set of satisfiable boolean expressions in conjunctive normal form.

Even setting this aside, there are additional difficulties in interpreting what $P = \text{NP}$ means in models of theories as weak as $ET$:

First, we observe that the proof of DeMillo and Lipton's Theorem does not use the fact that the set \( \{ x | (\exists y)A(x,y) \} \) is NP-complete. It uses only the fact that the relation $A$ is expressed by a quantifier-free formula in the language $L(ET)$. Since every recursively enumerable set is characterized by some existential predicate (again, this is Matijević's Theorem), it is just as reasonable to assert that it is consistent with $ET$ to believe that every recursively enumerable set is testable in polynomial time as it is to assert this merely of every NP-complete set.

Second, it is not clear that in the models of $ET$ in which

\[
(\forall x)[(\exists y)A(x,y) \iff \varphi(x)]
\]

holds for \( \varphi \in P_{\text{def}} \), that all of the members of $P_{\text{def}}$ are in fact testable in polynomial time. In fact, it is not even clear in models of such weak theories what it should mean to say that a set is testable in polynomial time. Here again, there are several difficulties: It seems that in theories like $ET$, one may not even be able to prove that different notions of computation, for example Turing machines, Markov algorithms, or Loop programs are equivalent, or if they are equivalent that they are polynomially time related. Thus, it seems that one must simply pick some notion of computation and analyze that notion.

Even when one has chosen such a notion, for example, the Loop programs of [6], once one picks a predicate $T$ that encodes sequences of computations, the $T$-predicate involves so much bounded quantification that it is difficult to know how it behaves in models of theories like $ET$.\(^8\) However as we observed above, there is a reasonable $T$-predicate that is testable in polynomial time, so it has a corresponding predicate symbol, $P_T$, explicitly introduced in the language $L(ET)$. Since $P_T$ and $T$ must agree on all of the elements of $N$, one might use $P_T$ as one's definition of computation in models of $ET$. Although $T$ and $P_T$ will agree on $N$, $T$ and $P_T$ suffer the same difficulties as $S$ and $P_S$ discussed above. In particular, we cannot guarantee that they agree in

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8. As pointed out by Gairz (19), (10), (11), similar problems arise for theories lacking multiplication.
nonstandard models of theories as weak as $ET$. Nevertheless, since the symbol $P_T$ obviously involves no bounded quantification, it is tempting to use it for analyzing computations in models of $ET$. Doing so has shown that with this notion of computation:

**Theorem:** For every recursively enumerable set \( \{x: (\exists y)A(x, y)\} \) there is a formula \( \varphi(x) \in P_{D&E} \) for which it is consistent with $ET$ to believe

\[
(\forall x)[(\exists y)A(x, y) \iff \varphi(x)]
\]

and that all formulas \( \varphi \) of $P_{D&E}$ have Loop programs which:

(a) correctly compute \( \varphi \) when they halt, and

(b) have a polynomial that bounds the number of steps of each computation.

Unfortunately, even if one accepts $P_T$ as expressing a meaningful notion of computation, the preceding theorem does not guarantee polynomial time decidability. For example, it is known that in models of weak fragments of arithmetic there can exist programs that run for only a bounded number of steps but still do not halt, [35]. Whether this or some other malady plagues the computations described in the preceding theorem, we are not sure, but nevertheless we have shown, [34], [33]:

**Theorem:** Under the same conditions as the preceding theorem, in the same model of $ET$ as constructed there; there are members, \( \varphi \), of $P_{D&E}$ that are not decided by any loop program in the model.

Exactly which predicates of $P_{D&E}$ can be tested in polynomial time in interesting nonstandard models of theories like $ET$ is an open question. In spite of this and our uncertainties about computations in models of theories like $ET$, we do know that the study of fast algorithms in such models is closely tied to how computations behave in the real world. There are theories very similar to $ET$ for which, if there exist models in which SAT is decidable in polynomial time, then in the standard model of computation SAT has arbitrarily long initial segments that can be decided by short, fast programs. If such short, fast programs for SAT do exist, then from a practical standpoint one might believe that SAT is "almost" polynomially decidable. We have obtained the following results, [32], [33]:

**Theorem:** It is consistent with $ET(Elem)$, (a theory that is quite similar to $ET$), to believe that NP-complete sets are polynomially decidable iff in the standard model of computation they have long initial segments that can be decided by short, fast programs.

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\[9.\] A similar result has been proved for Peano arithmetic by Kowalski, [40].
We certainly believe that NP-complete sets do not have long initial segments that are easily decidable by short programs, but the proof of this seems quite difficult and appears to be closely related to the question of whether or not they have small circuit complexity. However, we do know that P-complete sets (with respect to log space reducibility) and EXP-time-complete sets (with respect to polynomial time reducibility) do \textit{not} have long initial segments that are easily decidable by small programs and hence:

\textbf{Theorem}: It is \textit{not} consistent with ET(ET\textit{am}) to believe that polynomially complete sets are linearly decidable or that EXP-time-complete sets are polynomially decidable.

5. Basic Number Theory

One theory that is strong enough to support unambiguous notions of computation is Basic Number Theory \((B)\). This theory is obtained by taking as axioms all of the \(\Pi_2\) sentences (sentences of the form \((\forall x)(\exists y)A(x,y)\) where the matrix \(A\) is permitted \textit{bounded} quantifiers only) that are provable in Peano arithmetic. This theory has been extensively studied by logicians (Goldrei, Macintyre, and Simmons [18], Hirschfeld and Wheeler [29], Macintyre and Simmons [48], and Simmons [65]), and a great deal is known about its models. Since Lipton [45] first suggested its usefulness in studies of computational complexity, its \textit{adequacy} as a basis for theoretical computer science has been a matter of some debate. This issue has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, and we shall forego a thorough discussion of the adequacy of Basic Number Theory, instead referring the interested reader to such discussion already in the literature (Lipton [45], Joseph and Young [35], and Leviant [43]). These authors do point out that Basic Number Theory and closely related theories are adequate for proving many standard theorems of mathematics and computer science, a point that has been made much earlier, for example by Rogers [64], Chapter 14 (and in particular page 322).

For our current purposes, it is enough to know that for models of \(B\) notions of computation are invariant: Within \(B\) one can prove not only the equivalence of all of the standard models of computation, but also that they are polynomially related. That is, one can prove that the class of functions computable by Loop programs, Turing machines, RAMs or Markov algorithms is exactly the class of partial recursive functions and that the computation times are polynomially invariant. Therefore within models of \(B\) a function is easily computable if and only if there is a Loop program that easily computes it. However, as we shall see, in spite of the power of Basic Number Theory, it lacks sufficient inductive power to prove a number of standard results of theoretical and practical computer science.
One of the first computational independence results for weak theories of arithmetic was proved by Lipton \[45\] who showed that Rabin's Theorem is independent of Basic Number Theory. It is rather easy to prove that there are recursive sets that have no easy (e.g., linear or polynomial) decision procedures. In fact such a proof can be carried out within Basic Number Theory. Rabin \[62\] proved a somewhat stronger theorem, namely that there are recursive sets, $S$, for which every decision procedure takes a long time (e.g., exponential or more) on all but finitely many arguments. It is easy to see that for any such set $S$, neither $S$ nor $\overline{S}$ can have an easy to decide subset. It is also easy to see that for any set, $S$, whose characteristic function can be sped-up almost everywhere in the sense of Blum \[5\], neither $S$ nor $\overline{S}$ can have an easy to decide subset. In 1978, Lipton, \[45\], showed that these results are independent of Basic Number Theory:

**Theorem** (Lipton): For every standard (provably) recursive set $S$, there is a model of $B$ in which:

(i) Either $S$ or $\overline{S}$ has an infinite easily decidable subset.

Therefore

(ii) Rabin's theorem on the existence of almost everywhere difficult sets can not be proved in $B$.

and

(iii) Blum's theorem on the existence of functions that can be "sped-up" almost everywhere cannot be proved in $B$.

These results were strengthened by Leviant, \[43\]:

**Theorem** (Leviant): The proceeding results (i)-(iii) apply not just to provably recursive sets $S$ and the theory $B$, but also to all recursive sets $S$ and to the stronger theory $T_{I\Sigma_2}$ that has as axioms all true $\Pi_2$ sentences.

The two preceding theorems show that some esoteric (?) results of computational complexity cannot be proved within Basic Number Theory and the even stronger theory $T_{I\Sigma_2}$. Some of our own work, \[35\], shows that, despite the fact that Basic Number Theory and its extension $T_{I\Sigma_2}$ are fairly powerful theories, these theories possess even more fundamental limitations as formal theories for analyzing program behavior:

**Theorem**: There is a fairly large subclass, $C$, of the hypersimple sets (all of which are, of course, recursively enumerable but in fact undecidable) and there are nonstandard models of $T_{I\Sigma_2}$ in which:
(i) All members of $C$ are decidable in linear time.
(ii) Bounded sets are not all decidable.

And

(iii) There are Single Loop programs that contain only subroutine calls and assignment statements, which do not terminate despite the fact that each assignment statement and subroutine call correctly terminates. (Recall that Single Loop programs contain no nested loops and execute each loop only a fixed (constant) number of times.)

These results show that Basic Number Theory and the theory $T_H$ are inadequate for distinguishing between undecidability and linear time decidability even for a fairly natural subclass of standard undecidable sets, and that these theories are also inadequate for proving fairly routine statements about program termination for very simple classes of programs.

6. Concluding Remarks

In the years 1976-1983 we have witnessed renewed applications of logical techniques to problems in theoretical computer science. Prior to this time, logic contributed to computer science by providing underlying computational models for analyzing computational structures and complexities, by suggesting fundamental approaches for developing programming logics and exploring the consistency and completeness of these logics, and by suggesting techniques for specifying the semantics of programming languages. The work that we have reviewed here applies different techniques and different ideas. Often using model theoretic techniques, fundamental questions about computational complexity and the adequacy of proof procedures are investigated by connecting these questions to the study of limited logical structures, specifically by placing limitations on the syntactic structure of logical statements and by placing limitations on axiomatic systems used to analyze program behavior and complexity.

Some of the work which we have surveyed provides deep, and perhaps unexpected, connections between logic and computer science. Some gives evidence for the potential applicability of new model theoretic techniques. Some of the work seems, with the advantage of hindsight, surprisingly straightforward. While the ultimate value of this work, taken as a whole, is not yet clear, the work to date shows enough unity of technique, of ideas, and of fundamental approach to justify the hope that its most exciting applications are yet to come.
References


