Vulnerability Assessment and Secure Coding Practices for Middleware

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Roadmap

› Part 1: Vulnerability Assessment Process

› Part 2: Secure Coding Practices
Key Issues for Security

- Need independent assessment
  - Software engineers have long known that testing groups must be independent of development groups
- Need an assessment process that is NOT based solely on known vulnerabilities
  - Such approaches will not find new types and variations of attacks

Key Issues for Security

- Automated Analysis Tools have Serious Limitations
  - While they help find some local errors, they
    - MISS significant vulnerabilities (false negatives)
    - Produce voluminous reports (false positives)
- Programmers must be security-aware
  - Designing for security and the use of secure practices and standards does not guarantee security
Addressing these Issues

> We must evaluate the security of our code
  - The vulnerabilities are there and we want to find them first
> Assessment isn’t cheap
  - Automated tools create an illusion of security
> You can’t take shortcuts
  - Even if the development team is good at testing, they can’t do an effective assessment of their own code

Addressing these Issues

> First Principles Vulnerability Assessment (FPVA)
  - A strategy that focuses on critical resources
  - A strategy that is not based solely on known vulnerabilities
> We need to integrate assessment and remediation into the software development process
  - We have to be prepared to respond to the vulnerabilities we find
**Goal of FPVA**

- Understand a software system to focus search for security problems
- Find vulnerabilities
- Make the software more secure

"A vulnerability is a defect or weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that can be exercised and result in a security breach or violation of security policy."
- Gary McGraw, *Software Security*

i.e., a bad thing

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**First Principles Vulnerability Assessment**

**Step 1:** Architectural Analysis
**Step 2:** Resource Identification
**Step 3:** Trust & Privilege Analysis
**Step 4:** Component Evaluation
**Step 5:** Dissemination of Results
**Studied Systems**

- **Condor**, University of Wisconsin
  Batch queuing workload management system
- **SRB**, SDSC
  Storage Resource Broker - data grid
- **MyProxy**, NCSA
  Credential Management System
- **glExec**, Nikhef (in progress)
  Identity mapping service
- **CrossBroker**, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (in progress)
  Resource Manager for Parallel and Interactive Applications
- **Gratia Condor Probe**, NCSA (in progress)
  Feeds Condor Usage into Gratia Accounting System
- **Condor Quill**, University of Wisconsin (in progress)
  DBMS Storage of Condor Operational and Historical Data
- **Condor Privilege Separation**, University of Wisconsin (soon)
  Restricted Identity Switching Module

**First Principles Vulnerability Assessment**

**Understanding the System**

**Step 1: Architectural Analysis**

- Functionality and structure of the system, major components (modules, threads, processes), communication channels
- Interactions among components and with users
Step 1: Architectural Analysis

Attack Surface: User Supplied Data

› All attacks ultimately arise from attacker (user) communicated data
› If not, your system is malware
  - mere installation causes a security violation
› Important to know where the system gets user supplied data
› What data can users inject into the system

Step 1: Architectural Analysis

› Create a detailed big picture view of the system
› Document and diagram
  - What processes/hosts exist and their function
  - How users interact with them
  - How executables interact with each other
  - What privileges they have (!)
  - What resources they control and access (!)
  - Trust relationships (!)
Step 1: Architectural Analysis
External Services Used

> How are external programs used
> External services
  - Database (DBMS, LDAP, DNS, …)
  - Web server
  - Application server
  - Other
> External executables launched
  - Signs in the code: `popen` `system` `exec`*

Step 1: Architectural Analysis
Process Communication Channels

> What exists between...
  - Servers
  - Client and server
  - Client/Server and external programs
    - DBMS
    - DNS
    - LDAP
    - Kerberos
    - File services: NFS AFS ftp http ...
  - Helper applications
> Shows interaction between components
Step 1: Architectural Analysis

Condor

First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Understanding the System

Step 2: Resource Identification
- Key resources accessed by each component
- Operations allowed on those resources
Step 2: Resource Analysis

- A resource is an object that is useful to a user of the system and is controlled by the system
  - Data
    - files
    - DBMS
    - memory
  - Physical entities
    - Disk space
    - CPU cycles
    - Network bandwidth
    - Attached devices (sensors, controllers)

Step 2: Resource Identification

Documenting Resources

- What resources exist in the system
- What executables/hosts control the resource
- What operations are allowed
- What does an attacker gaining access to the resource imply
First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Understanding the System

Step 3: Trust & Privilege Analysis
- How components are protected and who can access them
- Privilege level at which each component runs
- Trust delegation
Step 3: Trust & Privilege Analysis

- Privilege is the authorization for a user to perform an operation on a resource
- Role is a set of privileges assigned to users to create classes of users such as admin
- Authentication
  - Is it performed correctly and securely
  - If an attacker can authenticate as another user they gain their privileges

Step 3: Trust & Privilege Analysis
Privileges in the System

- What privileges exist in the system
- Do they map appropriately to operations on resources
- Are they fine grained enough
- How are they enforced
Step 3: Trust & Privilege Analysis
External Privilege Systems

- System used: OS, DBMS, ...
- Accounts and privileges used
- Purpose of each account
- Does the program use external privileges to enforce its privilege model
- Are minimal privileges used
- Use of root or admin accounts require special attention

Step 3: Trust & Privilege Analysis
Trust

- An executable trusts another when
  - It relies on a behavior in the other
  - Doesn't or can't verify the behavior
- Implicit trust
  - The operating system
  - Process with root privilege on the same host
    - they can do anything
  - Processes with same uid on the same host
    - they can do anything to each other
  - All the code in your executable including libraries
Step 3: Trust & Privilege Analysis
Bad trust

› Not validating data from another trust domain for proper form (form, length, range)

› Bad assumptions
  - User supplied data is in proper form
  - Data passed through client is unchanged
    • Need a cryptographic signature
    • Happens with hidden input field and cookies in HTML

Step 3: Trust & Privilege Analysis
More Bad Trust

› Bad assumptions (cont.)
  - Client validated data
    • Client can be rewritten or replaced
    • Good to validate on the client, but server validation is required

› Not validating data from trusted processes
  - Allows an attack to spread
  - Not defense in depth
First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Search for Vulnerabilities

Step 4: Component Evaluation
- Examine critical components in depth
- Guide search using:
  - Diagrams from steps 1-3
  - Knowledge of vulnerabilities
- Helped by Automated scanning tools (!)

Step 4: Component Evaluation
Categories of Vulnerabilities

› Design Flaws
  - Problems inherent in the design
  - Hard to automate discovery

› Implementation Bugs
  - Improper use of the programming language, or
    of a library API
  - Localized in the code

› Operational vulnerabilities
  - Configuration or environment

› Social Engineering
  - Valid users tricked into attacking
Step 4: Component Evaluation
Many Types of Vulnerabilities

- Buffer overflows
- Injection attacks
  - Command injection (in a shell)
  - Format string attacks (in printf/scanf)
  - SQL injection
  - Cross-site scripting or XSS (in HTML)
- Directory traversal
- Integer vulnerabilities
- Race conditions
- Not properly dropping privilege
- Insecure permissions
- Denial of service
- Information leaks
- Lack of integrity checks
- Lack of authentication
- Lack of authorization

Step 4: Component Evaluation
Process Configuration

› How is an executable configured
  - Configuration file
  - Hard coded
  - Other
› What can be configured
  - How does it affect the application
  - Often reveals functional and architectural information
Step 4: Component Evaluation
Communication Methods

- OS provides a large variety of communication methods
  - Command line
  - Files
  - Creating processes
  - IPC
    - Pipes
    - FIFO’s or named pipes
    - System V IPC
    - Memory mapped files
  - Environment
  - Sockets
  - Signals
  - Directories
  - Symbolic links

First Principles Vulnerability Assessment Taking Actions

Step 5: Dissemination of Results
- Report vulnerabilities
- Interaction with developers
- Disclosure of vulnerabilities
Step 5: Dissemination of Results

Vulnerability Report

> One report per vulnerability
> Provide enough information for developers to reproduce and suggest mitigations
> Written so that a few sections can be removed and the abstracted report is still useful to users without revealing too much information to easily create an attack.

First Principles Vulnerability Assessment Taking Actions

Step 5: Dissemination of Results

CONDOR-2005-0003

Summary:

Arbitrary commands can be executed with the permissions of the condor_shadow or condor_gridmanager's effective uid (normally the "condor" user). This can result in a compromise of the condor configuration files, log files, and other files owned by the "condor" user. This may also aid in attacks on other accounts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Vulnerable Versions</th>
<th>Platform</th>
<th>Availability</th>
<th>Fix Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>condor_shadow</td>
<td>6.6 - 6.6.10</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>not known to be publicly available</td>
<td>6.6.11 - 6.7.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>condor_gridmanager</td>
<td>6.7 - 6.7.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>local ordinary user with a Condor authorization</td>
<td>Submission host</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Required</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host Type Required</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This vulnerability requires local access on a machine that is running a condor_schedd, to which the user can use condor_submit to submit a job.

Access Required: local ordinary user with a Condor authorization

To exploit this vulnerability requires only the submission of a Condor job with an invalid entry.

Impact/Consequences: high

Usually the condor_shadow and condor_gridmanager are configured to run as the "condor" user, and this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code as the "condor" user.

Depending on the configuration, additional more serious attacks may be possible. If the configuration files for the condor_master are writable by condor and the condor_master is run with root privileges, then root access can be gained. If the condor binaries are owned by the "condor" user, these executables could be replaced and when restarted, arbitrary code could be executed as the "condor" user. This would also allow root access as most condor daemons are started with an effective uid of root.
Step 5: Dissemination of Results
Vulnerability Report Items

> Summary
> Affected version(s) and platform
> Fixed version(s)
> Availability - is it known or being exploited
> Access required - what type of access does an attacker require: local/remote host? Authenticated? Special privileges?
> Effort required (low/med/high) - what type of skill and what is the probability of success

> Impact/Consequences (low/med/high) - how does it affect the system: minor information leak is low, gaining root access on the host is high
> Only in full report
  - Full details - full description of vulnerability and how to exploit it
  - Cause - root problem that allows it
  - Proposed fix - proposal to eliminate problem
  - Actual fix - how it was fixed
Step 5: Dissemination of Results
Vulnerability Disclosure Process

- Disclose vulnerability reports to developers
- Allow developers to mitigate problems in a release

Now here’s the really hard part:
- Publish abstract disclosures in cooperation with developers. When?
- Publish full disclosures in cooperation with developers. When?

Summary of Results
First Principles Vulnerability Assessment

Technique has been extremely successful
- found critical problems
- helped groups redesign software
- changed their development practices and release cycle management
Our Work -- Summary

Assess: We continue to assess new software systems

Train: We present tutorials and white papers, and continue to develop new educational materials

Research: Our results provide the foundation for new research to make FPVA less labor-intensive and improve quality of automated code analysis