



# *OSG Security*

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# *Largest Scientific Environments*

- May very well be in experimental High Energy Physics.
  - Global collaborations > 2000 scientists
  - Nations make contributions to build the accelerator and experimental equipment.
  - Tremendous amounts of data,
    - need to constantly calibrate, select and analyze.
  - Experiment
    - has pledged computing resources.
    - Has non-pledged resources.



# *The OSG*

- **Proposal:** “We propose to build a cyber-infrastructure that can grow to provide thousands of users effective access to 100,000 CPUs, 10s of PB of storage, located at hundreds of sites and interconnected by multiple 10Gb/s network links.”
- **Technical Basis:**
  - Service-based access to compute and storage services.
  - A software stack used by experiments to manage their users, their jobs, and their jobs.
  - The environment **interoperates** with other similar grid environments.
    - LCG, teragrid, et al.




# Example Capabilities


9.6 gbps average rate  
(binned by hour)



52 TB/day  
Tape/HSM



Maximum: 1284.64 MB/s, Minimum: 27.51 MB/s, Average: 746.83 MB/s, Current: 281.06 MB/s





# OSG Capacity Targets


| Org          | MSI2000   |           |           |           | Petabytes  |            |             |             |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
|              | 2006      | 2007      | 2008      | 2009      | 2006       | 2007       | 2008        | 2009        |
| ATLAS        | 3         | 5         | 14        | 24        | 1.1        | 2.6        | 7.6         | 11.8        |
| CMS          | 4         | 8         | 16        | 22        | 1.0        | 2.5        | 4.5         | 4.9         |
| LIGO         | 4         | 5         | 6         | 6         | 0.2        | TBD        | TBD         | TBD         |
| STAR         | 2         | 3         | 6         | 12        | 0.04       | 0.06       | 0.1         | 0.2         |
| other        | 10        | 13        | 17        | 22        | 1.0        | 1.0        | 1.4         | 1.9         |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>23</b> | <b>34</b> | <b>59</b> | <b>86</b> | <b>3.3</b> | <b>6.1</b> | <b>13.6</b> | <b>18.8</b> |

5/2/07

In 2008 we estimate: 53 MSI2K = 26,000 CPUs; 74 MSI2K = 37,000 CPUs;  
 DLP (FNAL/OSG) -- Condor Week




# Me, my friends, the grid





# Illustrative example





# *Grid Security*

- The goal of grid security is establish trust that computing organized along these lines will have appropriate integrity, availability, and confidentiality.
- OSG cannot bear the security responsibilities of sites or VO's.
- Therefore, initially, inter-entity security is conceptually a set of pair-wise agreements.
  - We have more than a few autonomous parties
  - Not a small task.





# Operational Grid Security

- Based on NIST model -- Controls based on risk, rooted in policy.
  - Risk ==  $f(\text{vulnerability, threat})$
  - Goal: Achieve acceptable risk
    - Recall -- context is open science.
  - Means: Controls
    - Management (what did we decide?)
    - Operational (we count on behaviors)
    - Technical (stuff done in HW/SW)



## *Some Specifics*

- OSG security seeks to compliment, not replace site and VO security organizations.
  - Recall Roadmap:  $O(10^4)$  parties. Now:  $O(10^3)$ 
    - Make the security discussion scalable by standardizing the many elements of the discussion.
  - Foster a secure software stack for grid services.
  - Foster communications
  - Know what's going on from the perspective of the whole grid



## *Scaling:*

- Make the discussion standard.
  - Think of the market in mortgages
    - Many standard terms
- Model security policies
  - JSPG: sites, VOs, users.
  - IGTF: Identity providers.
  - TBD:
    - Service providers (likely JSPG),
    - software providers.



# *Foster secure software stack*

- OSG Stack: Primary role is through the OSG software coordinator.
  - Sites use versioned OSG stack w/OSG controls.
  - VO's -- Less standard, less enumerable
- Absolute dependency on the skills and quality of our system software community.
  - Success depends on sponsors of these groups
  - OSG job is to
    - Demand good qualities
    - Recognize good qualities.
    - Proselytize the scale changes



## *Foster communications*

- Grid operating organization assembles, and maintains list of site security contacts.
- Two levels
  - Incident/urgent matters.
  - Discussion/thinking
- Communication is available for non-grid matters. (e.g sniffed password of a person w/ distributed administration responsibilities).



## *Current work: Situational Awareness*

- Is the configuration of deployed stack at sites as expected?
- Is someone rattling the doorknob systematically at OSG sites?
- Has compromise of a server compromised the grid?
- Are AUP's abided by?



## Summary

- Grid security is federated -  $O(10^4)$  entities.
  - The problem is made more tractable
    - By the service oriented access to resources.
    - By standardizing the terms of discussion.
    - Because interoperation is viewed as essential by all parties
- Currently, the security structure of sites is more standard than the structure of VO's.
- Grid security is complimentary to site and VO security organizations.
- Absolutely dependent on the quality of community written software components.