

10 common programming mistakes that make you vulnerable to attack

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Things That We All Know

- All software has **vulnerabilities**
- Critical infrastructure software is **complex** and **large**
- Vulnerabilities can be exploited by both authorized users and by outsiders
- **Programmers must be security-aware**
 - Designing for security and the use of secure practices and standards does not guarantee security... but helps

What do we do

- **Assess Middleware:** Make cloud/grid software more secure
- **Train:** We teach tutorials for users, developers, sys admins, and managers
- **Research:** Make in-depth assessments more automated and improve quality of automated code analysis

<http://www.cs.wisc.edu/mist/papers/VAshort.pdf>




1. Buffer overflow




Buffer Overflow of User Data Affecting Flow of Control



```
char id[8];  
int  validId = 0;    /* not valid */
```



```
gets(id);    /* reads "evillogin" */
```



```
/* validId is now 110 decimal */  
if (IsValid(id)) validId = 1; /* not true */  
if (validId)      /* is true */  
    {DoPrivilegedOp();} /* gets executed */
```

2. Numeric Errors



Integer Vulnerabilities

- **Description**
 - Many programming languages allow silent loss of integer data without warning due to
 - Overflow
 - Truncation
 - Signed vs. unsigned representations
 - Code may be secure on one platform, but silently vulnerable on another, due to different underlying integer types.
- **General causes**
 - Not checking for overflow
 - Mixing integer types of different ranges
 - Mixing unsigned and signed integers

Numeric Parsing Unreported Errors



- `atoi`, `atol`, `atof`, `scanf` family (with `%u`, `%i`, `%d`, `%x` and `%o` specifiers)
 - Out of range values **results in unspecified behavior**
 - Non-numeric input **returns 0**

3. Race Conditions



File System Race Examples

C/C++

- Check properties of a file then open
 - Bad:** `access` or `stat` → `open`
 - Safe:** `open` → `fstat`
- Create file if it doesn't exist
 - Bad:** if `stat` fails → `creat(fn, mode)`
 - Safe:** `open(fn, O_CREAT|O_EXCL, mode)`
- <http://www.cs.wisc.edu/mist/safefile>
James A. Kupsch and Barton P. Miller, "How to Open a File and Not Get Hacked," 2008 Third International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), Barcelona, Spain, March 2008.

Race Condition Examples

C/C++

• Your Actions

```
s=strdup("/tmp/zXXXXXX")
tempnam(s)
// s now "/tmp/zRANDOM"

f = fopen(s, "w+")
// writes now update
// /etc/passwd
```

time



Attackers Action

```
link = "/etc/passwd"
file = "/tmp/zRANDOM"
symlink(link, file)
```

4. Exceptions



Exception Suppression

JAVA



1. User sends malicious data

user="admin", pwd=**null**

```
boolean Login(String user, String pwd) {
    boolean loggedIn = true;
    String realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);
    try {
        if (!GetMd5(pwd).equals(realPwd)) {
            loggedIn = false;
        }
    } catch (Exception e) {
        //this can not happen, ignore
    }
    return loggedIn;
}
```

2. System grants access

Login() returns **true**

5. Too much information



WTMI (Way Too Much Info)



```
Login(... user, ... pwd) {  
  try {  
    ValidatePwd(user, pwd);  
  } catch (Exception e) {  
    print("Login failed.\n");  
    print(e + "\n");  
    e.printStackTrace();  
    return;  
  }  
}
```

```
void ValidatePwd(... user, ... pwd)  
    throws BadUser, BadPwd {  
  realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);  
  if (realPwd == null)  
    throw BadUser("user=" + user);  
  if (!pwd.equals(realPwd))  
    throw BadPwd("user=" + user  
      + " pwd=" + pwd  
      + " expected=" + realPwd);  
}
```

User exists Entered pwd

```
Login failed.  
BadPwd: user=bob pwd=x expected=password  
BadPwd:  
  at Auth.ValidatePwd (Auth.java:92)  
  at Auth.Login (Auth.java:197)  
  ...  
  com.foo.BadFramework(BadFramework.java:71)  
  ...
```

User's actual password ?!?
(passwords aren't hashed)

Reveals internal structure
(libraries used, call structure,
version information)

6. Directory Traversal

Successful Directory Traversal Attack



1. Users requests

File="...//etc/passwd"



```
String path = request.getParameter("file");  
path = "/safedir/" + path;  
// remove ../'s to prevent escaping out of /safedir  
Replace(path, "../", "");  
File f = new File(path);  
f.delete();
```

2. Server deletes

/etc/passwd

Before Replace path = "/safedir/...//etc/passwd"

After Replace path = "/safedir/../etc/passwd"

7. SQL Injection Attacks

Successful SQL Injection Attack



- Dynamically generated SQL without validation or quoting is vulnerable

```
$u = " ' ; drop table t --";  
$sth = $dbh->do("select * from t where u = '$u'");
```

Database sees two statements:

```
select * from t where u = ' ' ; drop table t --'
```

Successful SQL Injection Attack



2. DB Queried

```
SELECT * FROM members  
WHERE u='admin' AND p=' ' OR 'x'='x'
```

3. Returns all row of table members

JAVA

1. User sends malicious data

```
user="admin"; pwd="' OR 'x'='x'"
```

```
boolean Login(String user, String pwd) {  
    boolean loggedIn = false;  
    conn = pool.getConnection();  
    stmt = conn.createStatement();  
    rs = stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM members"  
        + "WHERE u='" + user  
        + "' AND p='" + pwd + "'");  
  
    if (rs.next())  
        loggedIn = true;  
}
```

4. System grants access

```
Login() returns true
```

8. Command Injections

Successful OS Injection Attack



1. User sends malicious data

```
hostname="x.com;rm -rf /*"
```

2. Application uses nslookup to get DNS records

```
String rDomainName(String hostname) {  
    ...  
    String cmd = "/usr/bin/nslookup " + hostname;  
    Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);  
    ...  
}
```

3. System executes

```
nslookup x.com;rm -rf /*
```

4. All files possible are deleted

9. Code Injection

Code Injection Vulnerability

1. logfile – name's value is user controlled

```
name = John Smith
name = ');import os;os.system('evilprog');#
```



Read
logfile

2. Perl log processing code – uses Python to do real work

```
%data = ReadLogFile('logfile');
PH = open("|/usr/bin/python");
print PH "import LogIt\n";
while (($k, $v) = (each %data)) {
    if ($k eq 'name') {
        print PH "LogIt.Name('$v')";
    }
}
```

Start Python,
program sent
on stdin

3. Python source executed – 2nd LogIt executes arbitrary code

```
import LogIt;
LogIt.Name('John Smith')
LogIt.Name('');import os;os.system('evilprog');#'
```


10. Web Attacks



Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS)



3. Generated HTML displayed by browser

```
<html>
...
You searched for:
widget
...
</html>
```

1. Browser sends request to web server

```
http://example.com?q=widget
```

2. Web server code handles request

```
...
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {
    out.println("You searched for:\n" + query);
}
...
```

Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS)



3. Generated HTML displayed by browser

```
<html>
...
You searched for:
<script>alert('Boo!')</script>
...
</html>
```

1. Browser sends request to web server

```
http://example.com?q=<script>alert('Boo!')</script>
```

2. Web server code handles request

```
...
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {
    out.println("You searched for:\n" + query);
}
...
```

Would you like an expanded tutorial taught at your site?

Tutorials for users, developers, administrators and managers:

- Security Risks
- Secure Programming
- Vulnerability Assessment

Contact us!

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Questions?

<http://www.cs.wisc.edu/mist>