Computer Sciences Dept.

Computer Security and Cryptography Reading Group
February 2006 List

Date &
Location
Reading
Friday, February 3, 2006
11 AM - 12 PM
7331 CS

W. Cui

V. Paxson
W. Cui, V. Paxson, N. Weaver, R. H. Katz
Berkeley / ICSI
Protocol-Independent Adaptive Replay of Application Dialog
NDSS'06

URL: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~wdc/papers/CPWK06.pdf

For many applications---including recognizing malware variants, determining the range of system versions vulnerable to a given attack, testing defense mechanisms, and filtering multi-step attacks---it can be highly useful to mimic an existing system while interacting with a live host on the network. We present RolePlayer, a system which, given examples of an application session, can mimic both the client side and the server side of the session for a wide variety of application protocols. A key property of RolePlayer is that it operates in an application-independent fashion: the system does not require any specifics about the particular application it mimics. It instead uses byte-stream alignment algorithms to compare different instances of a session to determine which fields it must change to successfully replay one side of the session. Drawing only on knowledge of a few low-level syntactic conventions (such as representing IP addresses using "dotted quads"), and contextual information such as the domain names of the participating hosts, RolePlayer can heuristically detect and adjust network addresses, ports, cookies, and length fields embedded within the session, including sessions that span multiple, concurrent connections on dynamically assigned ports.

We have successfully used RolePlayer to replay both the client and server sides for a variety of network applications, including NFS, FTP, and CIFS/SMB file transfers, as well as the multi-stage infection processes of the Blaster and W32.Randex.D worms.

Friday, February 10, 2006
11 AM - 12 PM
7331 CS

S. Neuhaus

A. Zeller
S. Neuhaus, A. Zeller
Saarland U.
Isolating Intrusions by Automatic Experiments
NDSS'06

URL: http://www.st.cs.uni-sb.de/~neuhaus/publications/isoproc.pdf

When dealing with malware infections, one of the first tasks is to find the processes that were involved in the attack. We introduce Malfor, a system that isolates those processes automatically. In contrast to other methods that help analyze attacks, Malfor works by experiments: first, we record the interaction of the system under attack; after the intrusion has been detected, we replay the recorded events in slightly different configurations to see which processes were relevant for the intrusion. This approach has three advantages over deductive approaches: first, the processes that are thus found have been experimentally shown to be relevant for the attack; second, the amount of evidence that must then be analyzed to find the attack vector is greatly reduced; and third, Malfor itself cannot make wrong deductions. In a first experiment, Malfor was able to extract the three processes responsible for an attack from 32 candidates in about six minutes.

Friday, February 17, 2006
11 AM - 12 PM
7331 CS

S. M. Bellovin

A. Keromytis

B. Cheswick
S. M. Bellovin, A. Keromytis, B. Cheswick
Columbia U. / Lumeta / Columbia U.
Worm propagation strategies in an IPv6 Internet
;login: Magazine, Feb. 2006

URL: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/v6worms.pdf

In recent years, the Internet has been plagued by a number of worms. One popular mechanism that worms use to detect vulnerable targets is random IP address-space probing. This is feasible in the current Internet due to the use of 32-bit addresses, which allow fast-operating worms to scan the entire address space in a matter of a few hours. The question has arisen whether or not their spread will be affected by the deployment of IPv6. In particular, it has been suggested that the 128-bit IPv6 address space (relative to the current 32-bit IPv4 address space) will make life harder for the worm writers: assuming that the total number of hosts on the Internet does not suddenly increase by a similar factor, the work factor for finding a target in an IPv6 Internet will increase by approximately 296, rendering random scanning seemingly prohibitively expensive.

Friday, February 24, 2006
11 AM - 12 PM
7331 CS

T. Jaeger

R. Sailer
U. Shankar, T. Jaeger, R. Sailer
Berkeley / PSU / IBM T.J. Watson
Toward Automated Information-Flow Integrity Verification for Security-Critical Applications
NDSS 2006

URL: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~ushankar/research/cwlite/cwlite.pdf

We provide a largely automated system for verifying Clark- Wilson interprocess information-flow integrity. Information-flow integrity properties are essential to isolate trusted processes from untrusted ones, but system misconfiguration can easily create insecure dependences. For example, an untrusted user process may be able to write to sshd_config via a cron script. A useful notion of integrity is the Clark-Wilson integrity model [7], which allows trusted processes to accept necessary untrusted inputs (e.g., network data or print jobs) via filtering interfaces that sanitize the data. However, Clark-Wilson has the requirement that programs undergo formal semantic verification; in practice, this kind of burden has meant that no information-flow integrity property is verified on most widely-used systems. We define a weaker version of Clark-Wilson integrity, called CW-Lite, which has the same interprocess information-flow guarantees, but which requires less filtering, only small changes to existing applications, and which we can check using automated tools. We modify the SELinux user library and kernel module in order to support CW-Lite integrity verification and develop new software tools to aid developers in finding and enabling filtering interfaces. Using our toolset, we found and fixed several integrity-violating configuration errors in the default SELinux policies for OpenSSH and vsftpd.


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Created and maintained by Mihai Christodorescu (http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~mihai)
Created: Fri Jan 27 11:58:07 2006
Last modified: Fri Jan 27 11:59:05 Central Standard Time 2006
 
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