Computer Sciences Dept.

Computer Security and Cryptography Reading Group
March 2005 List

Date &
Location
Reading
Thursday, March 3, 2005
2 PM - 3 PM
7331 CS

S.C. Bono

M.D. Green

A. Stubblefield

A. Rubin

A. Juels

M. Szydlo
S.C. Bono, M.D. Green, A. Stubblefield, A. Rubin, A. Juels, M. Szydlo
Johns Hopkins University / RSA Laboratories
Security Analysis of a Cryptographically-Enabled RFID Device

URL: http://rfidanalysis.org/DSTbreak.pdf

We describe our success in defeating the security of an RFID device known as a Digital Signature Transponder (DST). Manufactured by Texas Instruments, DST (and variant) devices help secure millions of SpeedPassTM payment transponders and automobile ignition keys. Our analysis of the DST involved three phases:

  1. Reverse engineering: Starting from a rough published schematic, we determined the complete functional details of the cipher underpinning the challenge-response protocol in the DST. We accomplished this with only “oracle” or “black-box” access to an ordinary DST, that is, by experimental observation of responses output by the device.
  2. Key cracking: The key length for the DST is only 40 bits. With an array of of sixteen FPGAs operating in parallel, we can recover a DST key in under an hour using two responses to arbitrary challenges.
  3. Simulation: Given the key (and serial number) of a DST, we are able to simulate its RF output so as to spoof a reader. As validation of our results, we purchased gasoline at a service station and started an automobile using simulated DST devices.

We accomplished all of these steps using inexpensive off-the-shelf equipment, and with minimal RF expertise. This suggests that an attacker with modest resources can emulate a target DST after brief short-range scanning or long-range eavesdropping across several authentication sessions. We conclude that the cryptographic protection afforded by the DST device is relatively weak.

Thursday, March 10, 2005
2 PM - 3 PM
7331 CS

R. Gopalakrishna

E.H. Spafford

J. Vitek
R. Gopalakrishna, E.H. Spafford, J. Vitek
Purdue
Efficient Intrusion Detection using Automaton Inlining
Oakland'05

URL: http://www.cs.wisc.edu/areas/sec/gopalakrishnar_automaton.pdf

Host-based intrusion detection systems attempt to identify attacks by discovering program behaviors that deviate from expected patterns. While the idea of performing behavior validation on-the-fly and terminating errant tasks as soon as a violation is detected is appealing, existing systems exhibit serious shortcomings in terms of accuracy and/or efficiency. To gain acceptance, a number of technical advances are needed. In this paper we focus on automated, conservative, intrusion detection techniques, i.e. techniques which do not require human intervention and do not suffer from false positives.

We present a static analysis algorithm for constructing a flow- and context-sensitive model of a program that allows for efficient online validation. Context-sensitivity is essential to reduce the number of impossible control-flow paths accepted by the intrusion detection system because such paths provide opportunities for attackers to evade detection. An important consideration for on-the-fly intrusion detection is to reduce the performance overhead caused by monitoring. Compared to the existing approaches, our inlined automaton model (IAM) presents a good tradeoff between accuracy and performance. On a 32K line program, the monitoring overhead is negligible. While the space requirements of a naive IAM implementation can be quite high, compaction techniques can be employed to substantially reduce that footprint.

Thursday, March 17, 2005
2 PM - 3 PM
7331 CS

T. Kohno

kc claffy
T. Kohno, A. Broido, kc claffy
UCSD / CAIDA
Remote physical device fingerprinting
Oakland'05

URL: http://www.cse.ucsd.edu/users/tkohno/papers/PDF/

We introduce the area of remote physical device fingerprinting, or fingerprinting a physical device, as opposed to an operating system or class of devices, remotely, and without the fingerprinted device's known cooperation. We accomplish this goal by exploiting small, microscopic deviations in device hardware: clock skews. Our techniques do not require any modification to the fingerprinted devices. Our techniques report consistent measurements when the measurer is thousands of miles, multiple hops, and tens of milliseconds away from the fingerprinted device, and when the fingerprinted device is connected to the Internet from different locations and via different access technologies. Further, one can apply our passive and semi-passive techniques when the fingerprinted device is behind a NAT or firewall, and also when the device's system time is maintained via NTP or SNTP. One can use our techniques to obtain information about whether two devices on the Internet, possibly shifted in time or IP addresses, are actually the same physical device. Example applications include: computer forensics; tracking, with some probability, a physical device as it connects to the Internet from different public access points; counting the number of devices behind a NAT even when the devices use constant or random IP IDs; remotely probing a block of addresses to determine if the addresses correspond to virtual hosts, e.g., as part of a virtual honeynet; and unanonymizing anonymized network traces.

Thursday, March 24, 2005
1 PM - 2 PM
5331 CS

J. Newsome

B. Karp

D. Song
J. Newsome, B. Karp, D. Song
CMU
Polygraph: Automatically Generating Signatures For Polymorphic Worms
Oakland'05

URL: http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~bkarp/polygraph-oakland2005.pdf

It is widely believed that content-signature-based intrusion detection systems (IDSes) are easily evaded by polymorphic worms, which vary their payload on every infection attempt. In this paper, we present Polygraph, a signature generation system that successfully produces signatures that match polymorphic worms. Polygraph generates signatures that consist of multiple disjoint content substrings. In doing so, Polygraph leverages our insight that for a real-world exploit to function properly, multiple invariant substrings must often be present in all variants of a payload; these substrings typically correspond to protocol framing, return addresses, and in some cases, poorly obfuscated code. We contribute a definition of the polymorphic signature generation problem; propose classes of signature suited for matching polymorphic worm payloads; and present algorithms for automatic generation of signatures in these classes. Our evaluation of these algorithms on a range of polymorphic worms demonstrates that Polygraph produces signatures for polymorphic worms that exhibit low false negatives and false positives.

Thursday, March 31, 2005
1 PM - 2 PM
5331 CS

J. Crowcroft
M. Costa, J. Crowcroft, M. Castro, A. Rowstron
MSR Cambridge / U. Cambridge
Can we contain Internet worms?
MSR TR

URL: http://research.microsoft.com/research/pubs/view.aspx?tr_id=788

Worm containment must be automatic because worms can spread too fast for humans to respond. Recent work has proposed a network centric approach to automate worm containment: network traffic is analyzed to derive a packet classifier that blocks (or rate-limits) worm propagation. This approach has fundamental limitations because the analysis has no information about the application vulnerabilities exploited by worms. This paper proposes Vigilante, a new host centric approach for automatic worm containment that addresses these limitations. Vigilante relies on collaborative worm detection at end hosts in the Internet but does not require hosts to trust each other. Hosts detect worms by analysing attempts to infect applications and broadcast self-certifying alerts (SCAs) when they detect a worm. SCAs are automatically generated machine-verifiable proofs of vulnerability; they can be independently and inexpensively verified by any host. Hosts can use SCAs to generate filters or patches that prevent infection. We present preliminary results showing that Vigilante can effectively contain fast spreading worms that exploit unknown vulnerabilities.


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Created and maintained by Mihai Christodorescu (http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~mihai)
Created: Fri Feb 04 16:32:13 2005
Last modified: Mon May 16 15:03:47 Central Daylight Time 2005
 
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