Computer Security and
Cryptography Reading Group
July 2003 List
Date & Location |
Reading |
2 July 2003
1304 CS
2:30 - 3:30 PM
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Classic paper
R. Kemmerer
University of California at Santa Barbara
A practical approach to identifying storage and timing channels: twenty years later
18th Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference, December 2002
URL: http://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-channels.pdf
Secure computer systems use both
mandatory and discretionary access
controls to restrict the flow of
information through legitimate
communication channels such as
files, shared memory and process
signals. Unfortunately, in practice
one finds that computer systems are
built such that users are not
limited to communicating only
through the intended communication
channels. As a result, a
well-founded concern of
security-conscious system designers
is the potential exploitation of
system storage locations and timing
facilities to provide unforeseen
communication channels to
users. These illegitimate channels
are known as covert storage and
timing channels.
Prior to the presentation of this
paper twenty years ago the covert
channel analysis that took place was
mostly ad hoc. Methods for
discovering and dealing with these
channels were mostly informal, and
the formal methods were restricted
to a particular specification
language. This paper presents a
methodology for discovering storage
and timing channels that can be used
through all phases of the software
life cycle to increase confidence
that all channels have been
identified. In the original paper
the methodology was presented and
applied to an example system having
three different descriptions:
English, formal specification, and
highorder language
implementation. In this paper only
the English requirements are
considered. However, the paper also
presents how the methodology has
evolved and the influence it had on
other work.
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9 July 2003
1304 CS
2:30 - 3:30 PM
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Recent paper
D. Boneh, M. Franklin
Stanford / UC Davis
Identity based encryption from the Weil pairing
SIAM J. of Computing, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 586-615, 2003
URL: http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/ibe.html
We propose a fully functional
identity-based encryption scheme
(IBE). The scheme has chosen
ciphertext security in the random
oracle model assuming an elliptic
curve variant of the computational
Diffie-Hellman problem. Our system
is based on the Weil pairing. We
give precise definitions for secure
identity based encryption schemes
and give several applications for
such systems.
Classic paper
A. Shamir
Dept. of Applied Mathematics, The Weizmann Institute of Science
Identity-based cryptosystems and signatures schemes
Advances in Cryptology -- Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 (G.R. Blakley and D. Chaum, eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 196, Springer-Verlag, 1985, pp. 47-53
URL: http://dsns.csie.nctu.edu.tw/research/crypto/HTML/PDF/C84/47.PDF
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30 July 2003
1304 CS
2:30 - 3:30 PM
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Recent paper
H.H. Feng, O.M. Kolesnikov, P. Fogla, W. Lee, W. Gong
University of Massachusetts / Georgia Institute of Technology / Georgia Institute of Technology / Georgia Institute of Technology / University of Massachusetts
Anomaly detection using call stack information
2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland'03), May 11 - 14, 2003
URL: http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~ok/w/ok_idpc.pdf
The call stack of a program
execution can be a very good
information source for intrusion
detection. There is no prior work on
dynamically extracting information
from call stack and effectively
using it to detect exploits. In this
paper, we propose a new method to do
anomaly detection using call stack
information. The basic idea is to
extract return addresses from the
call stack, and generate abstract
execution path between two program
execution points. Experiments show
that our method can detect some
attacks that cannot be detected by
other approaches, while its
convergence and false positive
performance is comparable to or
better than the other approaches. We
compare our method with other
approaches by analyzing their
underlying principles and thus
achieve a better characterization of
their performance, in particular, on
what and why attacks will be missed
by the various approaches.
Classic paper
A.K. Jones, W.A. Wulf
CMU
Tiwards the design of secure systems
"Software - Practice and Experience" vol. 5, p. 321-336 (1975)
URL: http://www.cs.wisc.edu/areas/os/Qual/Papers/Security/jones-secure.pdf
Within a programmed system, we may
distinguish between different kinds
of information in order to control
the use of each kind by separate
security policies, where each policy
is tailored to the sensitivity and
desired dissemination of that one
kind of information. This paper
analyses the implications of
implementing security policies and
describes mechanisms which can be
used as the basis for constructing
operating systems with the desired
security attributes.
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