May 10, 2002
1304 CS
1:30 - 2:30 PM
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Markus G. Kuhn, Ross J. Anderson
University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory
Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations
URL: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ih98-tempest.pdf
It is well known that
eavesdroppers can reconstruct video
screen content from radio frequency
emanations. We discuss techniques that
enable the software on a computer to
control the electromagnetic radiation it
transmits. This can be used for both
attack and defence. To attack a system,
malicious code can encode stolen
information in the machine's RF
emissions and optimise them for some
combination of reception range, receiver
cost and covertness. To defend a system,
a trusted screen driver can display
sensitive information using fonts which
minimise the energy of these
emissions. There is also an interesting
potential application to software
copyright protection.
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May 17, 2002
1304 CS
1:30 - 2:30 PM
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Markus G. Kuhn
University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory
Optical Time-Domain Eavesdropping Risks of CRT Displays
URL: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ieee02-optical.pdf
A new eavesdropping
technique can be used to read
cathode-ray tube (CRT) displays at a
distance. The intensity of the light
emitted by a raster-scan screen as a
function of time corresponds to the
video signal convolved with the impulse
response of the phosphors. Experiments
with a typical personal computer color
monitor show that enough high-frequency
content remains in the emitted light to
permit the reconstruction of readable
text by deconvolving the signal received
with a fast photosensor. These optical
compromising emanations can be received
even after diffuse reflection from a
wall. Shot noise from background light
is the critical performance factor. In a
sufficiently dark environment and with a
large enough sensor aperture,
practically significant reception
distances are possible. This information
security risk should be considered in
applications with high confidentiality
requirements, especially in those that
already require "TEMPEST"-shielded
equipment designed to minimize
radio-frequency emission-security
concerns.
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