Social Network Formation in Evolutionary Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with
Choice and Refusal of Partners
Mark Smucker
Department of Computer Sciences
University of Wisconsin-Madison
smucker@cs.wisc.edu
2:30 pm Fri. Sep. 9 in 2310 Computer Sciences and Statistics Bldg.
Social structures affect many human interactions. We study the
emergence of behaviors in an artificial ecology in which evolved
players use expected payoffs to select partners for games of
prisoner's dilemma. Each player has a finite state machine specifying
its prisoner's dilemma strategy, and a genetic algorithm is used to
evolve new players. Full cooperation is the most common behavior
which evolves in our simulations, but many other behaviors, which rely
upon interesting social network structures, also evolve. (In
collaboration with E. Ann Stanley, Dan Ashlock, and Leigh Tesfatsion
of Iowa State Univ.)